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ABSTRACT 
 
Civil conflict is a complex and ambiguous phenomenon that requires a multi-dimensional 
investigation. A concentration on rebel leaders in the study of conflict promises a good amount 
of potential for obtaining interesting findings. This dissertation examines rebel leader survival 
and rebel leaders’ influence on various conflict processes. It demonstrates that relative rebel 
strength, external support favoring the government, and oil production of the state have a 
significant impact on rebel leader tenure.  
To explain why we observe some considerable increases in the number of civilian 
killings in the course of conflict, the dissertation develops a theoretical model, putting the 
emphasis on rebel leader tenure and its potential in-group influences on the strategic decision of 
targeting civilians. Empirically, the analysis reveals a statistically significant relationship 
between civilian victimization and rebel leader tenure in Africa.  
The dissertation also contributes to the literature on state leaders, and interstate conflict 
more generally, by linking prior rebel leadership experience and militarized internationalized 
dispute initiation, showing that such experience is likely to increase the likelihood for state 
leaders to initiate armed conflicts. Introducing new data on rebel leaders in each substantive 
chapter, the dissertation offers a comprehensive, comparative and contextual treatment of rebel 
leaders and conflict.  
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CHAPTER I.  
INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION 	  
 
The sixth and current President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, previously commanded the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). When the former leader, Fred Rwigyema, led the group with a 
force of over 4,000 into Rwanda in October 1990, Kagame was attending a course in Fort 
Leavenworth, United States. Following the death of Rwigyema on the third day of the clashes 
between the government forces and the RPF, and the group's decaying chance of success due to 
the loss of more than half of the troops, Kagame returned to Africa and took command of the 
RPF forces. After two months of the regeneration of his soldiers, Kagame restarted the war, 
which lasted almost four years and finally resulted in the military victory of the RPF in July 1994 
(Asselin, St-Pierre, and Carment, 2007.) In four years, the RPF killed 1273 civilians (UCDP 
database). 
What differed between the RPF led by Kagame and the RPF led by his predecessor? Can 
we explain the discrepancy between the two practices by relying only on group dynamics? Or 
can an individual-level focus provide some fruitful insights? How did Kagame survive? When 
and why did he choose to victimize civilians? How did his experience as a rebel leader affect his 
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conflict-related tendencies when he became the President of Rwanda in 2000?1 This dissertation 
mainly aims to answer these questions by proposing a rebel leader-level focus on conflict 
processes.  
The role of individual political leaders has recently gained currency among scholars in 
international relations. Employing individual leaders as the primary focus of research provides 
the advantage of a clear emphasis on decision-makers, their individual-level impacts on political 
phenomena, and their incentives and constraints. However, the current research on civil conflict 
tends to consider rebel groups2 as unitary actors. Given the complex nature of rebellion and the 
pivotal role of leaders in rebel actions, I argue that this reductive perspective is overly simplistic. 
Despite the large literature on state leaders, the body of research focusing on rebel leaders falls 
on the weaker side of the conflict literature. Even most of the current research on state leaders 
and interstate conflict put emphasis on the role of domestic institutional arrangements in shaping 
leaders' behavior rather than the role of their attributes at the individual level.   
Attempting to fill this research gap within the literature, my dissertation studies rebel 
leaders and their influence on conflict processes. Employing rebel leaders as the level-of-analysis, 
except Chapter 3, it therefore seeks to find answers to the following questions: What are the 
determinants of rebel leader survival? Does leader tenure affect rebels' incentives to target 
civilians? If so, how? What happens when rebel leaders become state leaders? Do they seek to 
maintain peace and security or do they make their countries more conflict-prone internationally? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Paul Kagame had been de facto leader since 1994, but had focused more on military, foreign affairs and the 
country's security than day-to-day governance (Meredith, 2011). 
2 In this dissertation, I use the terms “rebels”, “rebel groups”, “rebel organization”, “rebellion”, “insurgents”, and 
“insurgency” interchangeably. These all are armed factions that use violence to challenge the state. These are 
distinguished from “militias”, a broader concept encompassing all armed factions that use violence including those 
that work alongside state forces, from “guerrilla”, a term that refers to a type of warfare that rebels frequently 
engage in but is not limited to rebel groups, nor is the only kind of warfare that rebels utilize. Using some politically 
ambiguous terms is also avoided such as “terrorist” and “freedom fighter” (Mampilly, 2011). For a detailed 
discussion of the taxonomy of armed groups, see Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah (2005) and Bhatia (2005).  
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Before all else, to ground the basis of the dissertation, I should highlight a central 
question: Why do rebel leaders matter? They are not homogenous, and they behave in different 
ways depending on their motivations and goals. Thus, they should not be treated as though they 
are all alike. However, there are some commonalities. First, they are highly likely to leave their 
individual stamp on the course of war with their strong preferences and distinctive personalities 
since they are less likely to be constrained by institutional checks and norms than state leaders. 
Thus, they are much more autonomous and individually engaged in conflict which makes them 
appropriate for an individual-level analysis. Even though they are mostly concerned with social 
pressures, and, as non-state actors, they are limited in their actions due to the limited capabilities 
they possess, they can still be influential actors in many civil wars. 
Second, in most cases rebel leaders are not only the leaders of rebellions, but also the 
organizers and instigators of them. They play a crucial role in all stages of rebellion seeking to 
recruit the best participants for their movements, find financial support, attempt to attract 
attention of third parties to internationalize the conflict if necessary, and, occasionally, target 
civilians to make an introduction to armed conflict and to demonstrate their ruthlessness as a 
rebel leader. Therefore, in most cases, the concept of "rebel leadership" should actually refer to 
an actor who has a broad sphere of influence within the conflict.  
Third, treating rebel groups as social movements, or treating them as if they were states, 
does not adequately help us to understand how they are organized and they operate. Such 
approaches may be fruitful for understanding the onset of civil conflict, but a more micro-level 
context is required to make a full sense of structural organization of rebel groups. 
Finally, understanding the behavior of rebel groups vis-a-vis incumbents requires 
knowledge of the individual-level dynamics underlying the rebel leadership. Hence, the need for 
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a focus on rebel leaders provides the motivation for this dissertation, which will attempt to open 
up the black box of leadership dynamics and rebel behavior, with the expectation of several 
theoretical and empirical implications.   
It is very common to define civil wars as a form of political violence with three major 
characteristics: they involve armed violence between incumbents and organized non-state groups 
that seek to capture control of the government or over a region or to gain some concessions from 
the government by means of violence; the armed conflict kills at least 1,000 people over its 
course and 100 on average in every year; and, finally, at least 100 people die on both sides of the 
conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).   
Ted Gurr, in Why Men Rebel  (1970), gave the statistic for civil conflicts between 1961-
1968: Some form of violent civil conflict broke out in 114 of the world’s 121 larger nations and 
colonies. Civil conflicts, however, especially in the period afterwards the Cold War, have 
become the dominant political record of the world. As of 2014, over 160 rebel organizations are 
still active in over 50 states, while we do not see any ongoing interstate armed conflict in the 
global arena.3 
This tendency has clearly bolstered the concentration on civil conflict, and rebel groups 
in particular, which has produced new understandings of conflict onset (Ross, 2004; Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Sambanis, 2005; Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin, 2007), third-party intervention (Regan, 
2002; Regan and Aydin, 2006; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, 2008), civilian victimization 
(Eck and Hultman, 2007; Wood, Kathman, and Gent, 2012; Wood and Kathman, 2014), and 
conflict outcomes (Walter, 1997; Karl and Sobek, 2004; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  UCDP conflict database, <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/database/>, 9.15.14.	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2009). Yet the literature lacks a key part of the puzzle that other fields of political science have 
long studied-- the influence of leaders over conflicts, processes, and outcomes.  
In line with the growing literature attaching importance to the role of leaders in conflicts, 
my dissertation aims to draw attention to the fact that individuals cannot be treated as 
insignificant or passive actors of armed civil conflicts. Individuals, on the contrary, often play a 
key role in all stages of conflicts by organizing, fighting, manipulating, and most importantly, 
leading a rebellion. Although decision-making and actions taken during wartime are often 
shaped and constrained by institutional settings and the conflict environment, this dissertation 
suggests that rebel leaders should be treated as the fundamental actors in civil wars, and, 
therefore, they should be integrated into theories of both civil war and leadership in international 
relations. 
The simplifying assumption of the dissertation is that rebel leaders' decisions and 
attributes come into play in different contexts in different ways. Their survival, concern of 
authority implementation, or leadership experience may have an impact upon different processes 
of conflict. Therefore, Chapters Two, Three, and Four focus on different phenomena in which 
rebel leaders play an important role.   
With my theoretical and empirical focus on rebel leaders, I aim to underline that 
analyzing conflict processes with a leader-level emphasis can open up new avenues of research 
on civil conflicts. I believe that there is much promise in research that investigates leader-level 
variability. As Chiozza and Goemans (2011) report, there is more variation at the leader level in 
international conflict than state or system levels. I simply argue that we can see a similar, but a 
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stronger, pattern in civil conflict as well since rebel leaders vary not only in their characteristics 
but also in their way of leading insurgencies.4 
Following Chapter Two, reviewing the literature of international relations on leaders, 
Chapter Three concentrates on rebel leader survival. In the light of the underlying differences 
mentioned above between state and rebel leaders, Chapter Two attempts to provide insights on 
why some of the determinants of staying in office may differ between state and rebel leaders 
while others may stay the same. Underlining the competing arguments about the impact of 
foreign support on state leader survival, therefore, it seeks to investigate how and in what 
direction this mechanism works for rebel leaders. Given that almost all rebel groups are 
autocratic organizations, Chapter Two examines whether the current arguments and findings on 
the destabilizing effects of external resources on autocratic state leaders remain standing for 
rebel leaders, or, third-parties, as some scholars contend, are more likely to provide support to 
state leaders facing elevated risks of losing office, and we expect that rebel leaders are more 
likely to stay in power when their rebellion is supported by an external party.   
Chapter Three also focuses on the potential causal relationship between relative rebel 
capabilities and rebel leader survival. One would easily expect that leaders of rebel groups with 
larger capabilities are more likely to stay in office since the chance of success is relatively higher. 
However, as Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003, p. 277) selectorate theory contends, when the 
leader’s followers cannot observe the available resources, and the leader diverts resources to her 
own use, the leader may face a challenger and the risk of losing power. Since larger capabilities 
come along with larger expectations of success from leaders during civil war, rebel elites may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Some rebel leaders are founders of the rebellion they lead, while others serve as a commander only.	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impose some costs on their leader in case of a downturn. Chapter Three, therefore, analyses the 
relationship between relative rebel strength and rebel leader survival as well.   
Chapter Four deals with the effects of rebel leaders' consolidation of power on rebel 
violence against civilians in civil war by suggesting that rebel leadership matters crucially in 
one-sided violence sustained by rebel groups against civilians. Most of the research on civil 
conflict tends to approach civilian victimization as a war-like rivalry and competition between 
governments and rebel groups. They compete for recruitment, public support, control of 
resources and strategic territories, and third-party support. Civil wars, however, are also the 
setting for competition occurring inside of rebel groups, which often have to face a handover of 
leadership. Although civil conflicts can potentially affect the government leaders’ future tenure 
as well, this kind of competition is almost inevitable in rebel groups since rebel leaders have to 
deal with the risk of death or capture. 
Chapter Four contends that intentional civilian killings are determined in part by rebel 
leaders’ consolidation of power, due to an in-group demonstration effect. I basically argue that 
the longer rebel leaders’ tenure, the stronger the signal of their dominance, control, and authority 
over their rebel forces. In this sense, victimizing civilians may serve as a part of authority 
implementation, which a leader must do to solidify his leadership. As Schneider (2009) points 
out, many rebel leaders consider victimizing civilians as an introduction to battlefield activities. 
Hence, targeting civilians in this case would not be a beneficial option for the longer-tenured 
leader in terms of demonstration of his power and dominance. The less consolidated leader, in 
contrast, is more likely to be expected to prove his competence through some reckless 
insurgency tactics. 
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By shifting the focus up to the interstate realm, Chapter Five investigates what prevailed 
rebel leaders transform into in the post-conflict period in terms of their proneness to interstate 
conflicts. Put otherwise, I analyze how prior rebel experiences influence state leaders’ decisions 
in terms of conflict initiation. The conventional wisdom that former experiences determine, or at 
least heavily affect, an individual's future behavior constitutes a central assumption in many 
fields of social science including psychology and sociology. Even though many political 
scientists may heuristically embrace this insight, the current interstate conflict research fails to 
incorporate adequately how this causal mechanism may systematically work in explaining 
leaders' conflict behavior.  
Assuming that all political leaders are risk-tolerant and ambitious to some extent, rebel 
leadership comes forth as one of the most relevant experiences for a state leader within this 
context. Despite the fact that all rebel leaders are not necessarily "revolutionary", in most cases 
they still have to be ruthless and risk-tolerant enough to attempt to overturn the established 
political apparatus and power of government. In other words, rebel leadership is a particularly 
risky endeavor because challenging the state with military force is an action much more likely to 
end in failure than success, and those on the losing side often suffer severe personal 
consequences.  
Given the historical record, especially in Africa, which shows that many rebel leaders 
became presidents after they had fought a civil war, Chapter Five suggests that prior rebel 
experience affects the way leaders make decisions to initiate conflict once they get into office. It 
also discusses another potential causal path between former rebel leaders and conflict initiation 
that relies on the internal factors such as institutional constraints and political structures.  
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Relying on two different bodies of literature --political-psychology-oriented research on 
the role of former experiences in political behavior including decision-making, and the emerging 
scholarly work on the causal mechanism between leaders' backgrounds and conflict behavior-- 
the two competing arguments presented in this chapter also attempt to integrate the insights that 
have been provided by these two avenues of research by underlying the causal paths previously 
addressed by both.  
Chapter Six concludes the dissertation, and provides a summary of findings obtained in 
each chapter, a discussion of the individual-level role of rebel leaders in conflict processes, and 
thoughts on future research. 
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CHAPTER II. 	  
REVIEWING EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP 	  	  	  
Four decades ago, the study of leaders came into prominence in the field of International 
Relations. In the 1960s and 1970s, scholars delved into international behavior by focusing on 
leaders, generally from an organizational perspective (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1962). 
However, the role of the international system predominated the field as the primary unit of 
analysis, even more so following Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979). Afterwards, 
this strong emphasis on the system was, to a large extent, substituted by a new focus on state 
characteristics and dyadic relations in the 1980s and 1990s, with work on the democratic peace 
as an obvious example (Doyle, 1983; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Bremer 1992; Maoz and Russett 
1993; Kochler, 1995). This shift was significantly promoted by the emergence of new data 
sources on country characteristics, such as the Polity data. More recently, however, the field has 
come full circle as scholars increasingly analyze international political behavior from the 
perspective of leaders (Goemans, 2000; Gelpi and Grieco, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; 
Chiozza and Choi, 2003; Chiozza and Goemans, 2003, 2004, 2011; Marinov, 2005; Horowitz, 
McDermott, and Stam, 2005). 
Despite the enormous growth in research on leaders over the last several years (Weeks, 
2012; Debs, and Goemans, 2010; Croco, 2011; Flores et al., 2013), most of the current studies on 
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leaders and interstate conflict focus on how domestic institutional settings constrain and 
influence the incentives for leaders’ behavior rather than demonstrating how variation in leaders' 
individual attributes affects state behavior. Most existing research on leaders themselves, though 
useful, generally analyzes the actions of individual leaders in isolation, rather than across space 
and time (Saunders, 2011), although some exceptions exist in the literature focusing on leader 
selection and the link between leaders and economic growth (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011; 
Jones and Olken, 2005), between leader attributes and conflict (Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam, 
2005;  Horowitz and Stam, 2012; Weeks, 2012;  Colgan, 2013a). 
Aside from these exceptions, the research on leaders focuses on how variations in 
domestic institutional contexts shape factors such as leadership tenure (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004), the institutionally-induced relationship between 
leadership tenure and conflict (Goemans, 2008; Debs and Goemans 2010), the responsibility and 
punishment of leaders (Goemans 2000; Croco, 2011; Wolford, 2012), and the decisions of 
leaders in the military arena (Weeks, 2011).  
Although they have attracted very limited attention so far, however, the individual-level 
effects have not been entirely disregarded in civil war research. While some scholars focus on 
broader questions to investigate why individuals choose to participate in civil wars (Gurr, 1970; 
Tilly, 1978; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008; Blattman and Miguel, 2010), others go further by 
dealing with their direct and/or indirect role in killing civilians (Walter, 2009; Valentino, 2004; 
Goemans, Gleditcsch, and Chiozza, 2009; Weinstein, 2007).  
An increasing number of studies point out that civilian victimization does not always 
stem from power asymmetries between rebels and governments, but from the incentives that 
armed crowds provide to their leaders. Drawing on the principal-agent literature, this point of 
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view conceives of one-sided violence as the by-product of a lack of control by the leader or the 
predominant recruitment of rebels whose primary incentive is having economic gain (Azam, 
2002; Mitchell, 2009). The existing empirical studies, though, tend to consider civilian-killing 
strategies as largely inefficient, attributing the action to the lack of control by the leaders or the 
recruitment of opportunistic killers instead of soldiers who are devoted to the long-term 
aspirations of the rebel organization (Weinstein, 2005, 2007). 
Once in control of territory, rebel leaders choose between resorting to violence to quell 
internal discontent and finding alternative ways of winning civilian support. At a basic level, 
controlling territory allows rebel leaders to offer benefits to civilians in ways that those without 
territory control could never do (Kriger, 1992). Reaching out to the noncombat civilian 
population makes strategic sense from the perspective of rebel leaders. Even in case of mass 
mobilization, only a tiny portion of the civilian population is likely to involve in conflict actively. 
Lichbach (1995) estimates that only about 5% of any population is likely to be active and 
militant participants. Wood (2003) put the upper limit at well below a third of the total 
population. When choosing to target civilians for strategic reasons, the key factor for rebel 
leaders is to ensure that this passive majority does not totally side against the insurgency. Some 
argue that it would be possible for rebel leaders, over time, to legitimize the rebel political 
authority in the eyes of civilians by working to normalize the social and political order and 
develop a comprehensive system of governance (Wickham-Crowley, 1987).  
Aside from the battle-related decisions, rebel leaders regularly engage in a variety of 
governance activities, including, but not limited to, establishing a system of food production and 
distribution, fulfilling the health and education needs of the population, providing security from 
the government violence, allocating resources to bring opportunities to civilians to involve in 
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their livelihood activities, resolving social disputes, and dealing with other social problems 
(Mampilly, 2011).  
Though the governance aspect of rebellion has not attracted the same attention from 
scholars of conflict as other aspects of rebel behavior. The writings of journalists, the reports of 
international organizations, and movement members’ documenting have been the largest chunk 
of the available resources that provide detailed information of the historical trajectory of specific 
rebel groups. Though fruitful, such accounts do not attempt to offer a theoretical framework for 
understanding rebel leadership as a discrete subject of inquiry. Especially in more recent 
analyses of rebel behavior, scholars have focused on insurgent interactions with civilians, 
recruitment strategies and the use of violence. This trend in the conflict research, particularly 
evident in the post-Collier literature on civil conflict, is inclined to simplify the highly complex 
rebel organization into its most eye-catching component, feeding the view that treats all non-state 
armed groups as criminal organizations (Mampilly, 2011, p. 6).5 These studies on recruitment 
and violence, therefore, do not provide much insight into the leader-level elements of rebel 
behavior.  
The body of research on civil conflict onset is not an exception to this. The two 
prominent models that explain where and why civil conflict occurs tell us surprisingly little about 
the structure of rebel organizations. While one approach treats rebellions as social movements 
(Gurr, 1970; Scott, 1976), the other treats rebel groups as if they were states (Posen, 1993; 
Wagner, 1993; Van Evera, 1994). There is no doubt that such approaches provide useful insights 
for understanding the onset of civil conflict. To make sense of the all processes of civil conflict, 
however, we need a more micro-level perspective on rebel organizations (Weinstein, 2007).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Although rebel governance is not the primary focus of his study, Weinstein (2007) is an important exception to 
this. 
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The first set of models, which puts forward the greed-grievance dichotomy, considers 
rebellion as the explosion of discontent from an aggrieved group of people. Grievances, which 
motivate and provoke masses to participate, lead to mass discontent, political instability, and 
violence especially when income inequality and a hierarchical class structure are coupled with 
ethnic cleavages (Gurr and Moore, 1997; Horowitz, 1985; Muller and Seligson, 1987). Greed, or 
opportunity, which often emerges when state capacity is weak, fuels some rebel organizations in 
which recruits seek to enrich themselves through looting natural resources, even though rebel 
leaders may not allow such motives (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999, 2004; Ross, 2004; Weinstein, 
2005). 
These models makes implicit assertions that residents of an aggrieved region would want 
to participate, would be allowed to participate, and/or would mobilize to act when the 
opportunity exists. These theories, therefore, offer little that helps to make sense of how rebels 
groups are structured, and adopt different organizational forms and practices (Weinstein, 2007). 
The second dominant approach tends to treat rebel groups as states or states in the 
making. Relying on the initial theoretical framework on interstate conflict, the followers of these 
models consider rebellion as the result of a security dilemma. Following the collapse or erosion 
of a central authority, groups compete for control to maximize and/or protect their own interests. 
Rebel groups, like sovereign states, operate in anarchic conditions of the system, and take actions 
to improve their own security since they cannot rely on the protection of the state. These 
security-maximizing actions, in turn, make other groups feel less secure. So, they respond in kind, 
and the political climate becomes less stable. Once all groups get active and offensive, violence 
arises (Posen, 1993; Evera, 1994; Wagner, 1993). 
	   15	  
This approach, again, largely lacks structural notions in its model of rebellion. The 
concept of the security dilemma does not offer any specific way in which we understand how 
rebel groups organize to protect their security, but rather simply suggests that they just do. The 
existence of anarchy is deemed sufficient to understand the participation of individuals in 
conflict, and the mobilization and operational structure of rebel groups. As Weinstein (2007) put 
it, rebel organizations, like states in traditional studies of interstate conflict, are treated like a 
black box. 
One of the rare contributions framed in leader-level comes from Mampilly (2011) who 
makes an analogy between Gramscian discussion of modern state and rebel organization. He 
asserts that rebel leaders face a challenge comparable to that described by Gramsci (1992) in his 
analysis of power and state. Although Gramsci’s focus is on modern state and its constituents, 
Mampilly argues that Gramsci’s insights are highly beneficial “[…] for understanding the 
behavior of rebel leaders seeking to exert control not only over a specific territory but over its 
corresponding civilian population as well. Specifically, in order to ensure their viability, 
insurgent leaders cannot only be concerned with the establishment of a coercive apparatus but 
must also gain a degree of consent from the civilian population”. In fact, this view replicates 
some of the functions and forms of state leaders that will allow a rebel leader to acquire civilian 
support for its political authority and achieve some form of legitimacy.  
Like governments of nation states, rebel leaders have to interact –and even negotiate– 
with civilians in exchange for their loyalty, which is a very hard task as demands of civilian 
population frequently consist of a variety of different and competing perspectives (Olson, 1993; 
Clapham, 1998). Rebel leaders may adopt a variety of approaches in their interaction with 
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civilians, ranging from adopting autocratic practices to providing them an opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making mechanism (Mampilly, 2011).   
Some scholars draw direct comparisons between processes of state formation and the 
emergence of rebel organizations. Some connects the provision of services by violent rebel 
actors to state formation (Reno, 2001), while others go further by asserting that rebel governance 
systems should be considered as de facto states (Pegg, 1998; Joseph, 2002). This approach bases 
its argument on the view that except for their lack of juridical recognition by the international 
community, such systems manifest all the attributes of states, and deserve to be treated as such at 
least conceptually: 
 
States-within-states have imposed effective control over a territory within a 
larger state and may have an impressive array of institutional structures that, 
among other things, allow taxes to be collected, services to be provided, and 
business with other international actors to be conducted. Yet, they lack the very 
thing that quasi-states do possess: juridical status (Kingston and Spears, 2004).6  
 
Some studies addressing rebel groups’ state-like functions pay more attention to the 
matter of organization (Skocpol, 1982; Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989). These studies tend to treat 
rebel organizations as legitimate competitors for the sovereign control of territory and claim that 
they begin to bring off the functions of incumbents even before they take power in the capital, 
and that the key function they perform is the provision of collective goods (Tilly, 1978). To be 
able to distribute collective goods, rebel groups have to be of sufficient size and strength to 
challenge the government. At this point, the conflict leads to a situation of multiple sovereignty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 One prominent exception was the offer by Andres Pastrana, the former Colombian President, to divide the territory 
into separate areas of government and FARC (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) control (Mampilly, 
2011).  
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in which at least two contenders compete to be the main political power and at least some part of 
the population esteems the movement of the rebel group by following its directives (Tilly, 1978; 
Weinstein, 2007). 
Through a credible claim to control over a specific part of the national territory, rebel 
leaders provide the potential recruits/subjects future collective benefits as an incentive for 
support, much as governments do when they provide basic health care, education and 
infrastructure. Even though insurgent collective action may entail the expectation of future 
collective benefits, in fact public costs predominate in the short term. In other words, individuals 
may participate in rebellion not in spite of risk but in order to better manage it (Kalyvas and 
Kocher, 2007).  
The most widely recognized explanation for why some rebel leaders manage to solve the 
collective action problem is that political change will generate private benefits for the leaders and 
their followers. Collier and Hoeffler (1999) suggest that “looting rebellions do not face intrinsic 
collective action problems because the activity is privately profitable. By contrast, justice 
rebellions face […] problems in collective action.” They specifically note that looting-centered 
insurgencies, unlike those that seek justice, need not defeat a government because their goal is 
achieved as long as they can keep stealing from the local population and exploiting mineral 
resources that they have seized.7 
Indeed, we see subtle agreements and disagreements between the emerging body of 
research on the economic incentives involved in civil conflict and the traditional economics 
school of thought.8 The empirical record that examines rebels reveals that almost all rebel leaders 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The civil wars occurred in Angola and Sierra Leone seem to fit into this scope, while those in Somalia, Rwanda, 
and Sudan do not.  
8 This distinction may cause a key difference in the understanding of civil conflicts. Some view civil war as merely 
a competition for resources between two sides (Besley and Persson (2008), while others point out a predatory state 
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use economic incentives but they also use other strategies to motivate their subjects, such as 
political indoctrination, coercion, and ethnic mobilization. The FLN (Algeria), the ZANU and 
ZAPU (Zimbabwe), and the ANC and PAC (South Africa) are examples of rebel groups that 
made costly investments in the political indoctrination of their fighters and, more interestingly, 
their followers. (Herbst, 2000).9 Rebellion-specific factors may cause different insurgencies to 
evolve in different ways, depending on the types of motivational resources that are available to 
leaders. Lootable resources may play a critical role in some cases, and sometimes they may be 
relatively irrelevant. Rebel leaders who have to face the definite risk of wipeout from a relatively 
strong political apparatus, thereby, must establish a cohesive militarized force where the 
motivations of fighters has been internalized through political and/or ethnic indoctrination 
fermented with a considerable amount of military coercion. Herbst (2000) suggests that  
 
As rational entrepreneurs of violence, rebel leaders decide to use that 
combination of motivations that is most likely to be effective given the state 
they are facing and the terrain of their country. Therefore, while scholars and 
policy makers are correct to recognize economic agendas as one aspect of civil 
wars in Africa (and elsewhere in the world), it is simply not persuasive to 
suggest that economic agendas are the only or even the primary driving force 
behind rebellion. 
  
Keen (1998) points out that ideologically motivated rebel leaders –Mao Zedong and Che 
Guevara– banned economic violence among their forces and obtained highly disciplined rebel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and a potential rebel leader, as the primary starters of the conflict, who seek to recruit masses with material and 
ideological incentives in order to seize the revenue of the state (Eck, 2007; Gates and Nordas, 2010).  9	  The FLN (Algeria), the ZANU and ZAPU (Zimbabwe), and the ANC and PAC (South Africa) are examples of 
rebel groups that made costly investments in the political indoctrination of their fighters and, more interestingly, 
their followers. 	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movements as a result. Nevertheless, Keen (1998) adds that, especially in the post-cold war era, 
civil conflict has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means as 
insurgencies are no longer anticolonial-oriented and it has become much harder than before for 
rebels to get foreign support. Consequently, rebels have to depend financially on the land and 
sometimes become overdependent to looting (Herbst, 2000).10 
One of the most important collective goods that rebel leaders provide is security. In 
particular, they pledge protection from incumbent forces (Weinstein, 2007). Counterinsurgent 
forces tend to act brutally, employing tactics that may target and victimize civilians 
indiscriminately in an effort to dry up the support base for rebel movements (Kalyvas, 2006). 
Such indiscriminate violence can drive individuals into the waiting arms of rebel leaders, 
especially when their groups are capable of mobilizing armed forces to protect civilians from 
further violence of the government. The historical record reveals that extreme levels of state 
violence often leave noncombatants no other option than to join the insurgents (Goodwin, 2001). 
Scholars also discuss at length how transboundary components interact with rebel leaders 
within conflict zones. These transboundary interactions “play a major role in creating, 
transforming, and destroying forms of order and authority” (Callaghy et al., 2001). Kassimir 
(2001) asserts that these transnational actors not only have an impact on the provision of services 
generally deemed the responsibility of the state but may also allege the right to represent an 
affected population.11 
Rebel leaders mostly remain aware of the potential benefits and risks of interacting with 
the transnational actors, and often seek to incorporate their relationships with such actors into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “The mining of diamonds by Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement in Angola and the creation of private 
commercial alliances in the vast areas of Liberia that Charles Taylor controlled before he was elected president in 
1997 (so-called Taylorland) are seen as prime examples of the new economics of war” (Herbst, 2000). 
11 One example of this kind of irredentist claims of states is the government of Rwanda’s repeated attempts to 
influence the Rwandophone population located in the eastern Congo. 
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political project of the rebellion (Bob, 2006). Since rebel groups tend to consider themselves as 
either governments-in-waiting or as detached political entities, their leaders seek legitimacy by 
engaging in interactions with transnational actors. International media coverage also comes into 
play at this point. Civil conflicts in ethnically diverse countries are highly likely to be ethnically 
patterned without being ethnically caused. International media coverage of conflicts often put the 
emphasis on history and ethnicity since rebel leaders adopt this sort of discourse.12 Grievances 
are to a rebel organization what image is to a business, and rebel leaders need to stimulate a 
sense of collective grievance to build cohesion in their army and to attract funding from their 
diaspora living in rich countries (Collier, 2003). They, however, try to find the correct balance in 
their interactions with these third-party actors since they still have to face incumbents who enjoy 
the advantage of being a political entity recognized by international community (Zahar, 2001).  
In addition to these transboundary elements, a limited literature slightly touches the 
leader-level dynamics within the military strategies that rebel leaders choose to employ. Bueno 
de Mesquita (2013) contends that  “[…] engaging in conflict has option value for the rebel 
leaders in the sense that it allows the rebel organization to survive to fight another day. When the 
rebel organization is close to defeat, the rebel leaders hold out hope that economic or military 
circumstances might change in a way that is more favorable to attracting mobilization.” 
Therefore, rebel leaders choose to pursue irregular conflict, which may take longer than their 
short-term interests, rather than withdraw from conflict and give up. This is especially true when 
the military environment is highly erratic, so that large shocks to rebel capacity –in either 
direction–are likely. The interesting feature of Bueno de Mesquita’s game-theoretical model is 
that the facts it relies on speak to a well-known debate in the conflict literature. Even where there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Fearon and Laitin (1996) assert that ethnicity also reduces monitoring and sanctioning costs for rebel leadership.  
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is no possibility of rebel victory, no electoral incentives, and no agency problems, the model 
generates behavior by rebel leaders similar to the “gambling for resurrection” behavior seen in 
international disputes (Downs and Rocke, 1994).13 
Kalyvas (2004), on the other hand, argues that both types (regular and irregular) of tactics 
are used by rebel leaders simultenously within the context of a civil war. Regarding the 
preferences of rebel leaders on military strategies, other scholars place the emphasis on 
materialistic factors –some of which might reflect the rebel group’s institutional design 
(Weinstein, 2007; Berman, 2009), internal factional conflict (Kydd and Walter, 2002; Bueno de 
Mesquita, 2005), sources of funding or weaponry (Weinstein, 2007), and control over territory 
(Carter, 2010).  
Another aspect to which the leader-oriented conflict literature pays attention is leader 
survival. The scholars of political science have long adopted the basic assumption that leaders do 
what they do to stay in office. Foreseeing the effect of their behavior on their tenure, leaders 
employ policies and strategies that maximize their time in office. This approach has been applied 
to decisions to initiate, escalate and continue conflict (Fearon, 1994; Downs and Rocke, 1994; 
Leeds and Davis, 1997; Schultz, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Colaresi, 2004; 
Mansfield and Snyder, 2005; Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam, 2005; Lai and Slater, 2006), to 
impose or comply with sanctions (Marinov, 2005), to promote economic development (Bates, 
1981; Wintrobe, 1998; Przeworski et al., 2000; Jones and Olken, 2005), to institute political 
reform (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1997), and the timing of elections (Warwick, 1994; 
Smith, 2003; Kayser, 2005).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Note that the empirical evidence for the theory is mixed.	  
	   22	  
The survival-maximizing leader assumption has been considered enormously influential 
and fruitful (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 2009). The body of research on civil conflicts, 
however, again lacks this wealth of literature on leader survival. Some recent studies specifically 
control for state leaders' tenure and suggest that governments with longer-tenured leaders are 
more likely to respond to rebel violence with counter-violence, especially in separatist rebellions 
(Walter, 2009), and that a higher risk of losing office increases the probability of civil war 
(Chiozza, Gleditcsch, and Goemans, 2004). 
However, the other side of the coin, rebel groups and their leaders, have been largely 
disregarded, although this renewed focus on the incentives of individual leaders holds much 
promise.14 Rebel leader tenure, indeed, may play a key role in the course of civil war. The 
historical record reveals that rebel leaders tend to be killed by the government, by their own 
elites or by accidents in the fogs of civil war with some regularity, as seen in the violent deaths 
of Evo Fernandes (RENAMO, Mozambique), Ibrahim Afa (EPLF, Eritrea), Josiah Tongogara 
(ZANU, Zimbabwe), Amilcar Cabral (PAIGC, Guinea-Bissau), Eduardo Mondlane (FRELIMO, 
Mozambique), Mohamed Farah Aideed (USC, Somalia), Fred Rwigyema (RPF, Rwanda), and 
Jonas Savimbi (MPLA, Angola)15. Most of these deaths had an impact on the outcome of the 
conflict (Herbst, 2000).  
 Additionally, a research agenda on rebel leader survival sits well with the 
methodological individualism of rational choice theory. Focusing on rebel leaders and their 
incentives can help increase explanatory variation (Jones and Olken, 2005; de Marchi, 2005). 
Common explanatory variables such as capabilities, ethnic fractionalization, regime type, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Chiozza and Goemans (2011) demonstrate that about one-third of the variation in interstate conflict derives from 
the personal characteristics and attributes of leaders (p. 201).  15 In Angola, an end to decades of civil war was only accomplished after the death of rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in 
early 2002.  
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economic indicators, and contiguity change too little, if at all, to account for dynamic phenomena 
such as civil war. An emphasis on leader characteristics introduces more variation, as leaders 
vary considerably in some important political and individual characteristics and their time and 
behavior in office. 
Considering these potential benefits, the following chapter will be an attempt to fill this 
gap and to offer a contribution to the so far limited literature on rebel leaders. Given the lack of 
theoretical and empirical development in this area, it will first put forth a theoretical framework 
that investigates the potential factors having an impact on leader survival. The hypotheses then 
will be tested with new data on rebel leaders.  
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CHAPTER III. 
REBEL LEADER SURVIVAL, RELATIVE REBEL 
STRENGTH, AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN CIVIL CONFLICT 
 
Rebel leaders, by definition, lead insurgencies, and their survival, in many cases, largely 
depends on the survival of their organizations. This, however, does not necessarily imply that 
rebel leaders are not survival-driven individuals who weigh their personal benefits and costs 
generated by conflict dynamics. They, on the contrary, have to "fight" for survival just as some 
of their state leader counterparts who are at risk of being forcibly removed from power. This is 
because this group of leaders must consider not just the probability, but also consequences of 
losing power (Goemans, 2000; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011). The potential individual-level 
costs of failure to keep their hold on power are not limited to "just the loss of leadership", which 
actually very rarely happens when it comes to rebel leaders.16 
However, despite this overlapping, it is hard to argue that the requirements of staying in 
power for rebel leaders entirely corresponds with the ones for state leaders operating in non-
democracies. While rebel leaders naturally have to be concerned primarily with the success of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  This is a strong generalization. There are, of course, some exceptions where rebel group members elect their 
leaders. Especially, the rebel groups operating as a fraction of a political party (Maoist, Communist etc.) tend to be 
led by an elected leader, although the election process mostly takes place in authoritarian norms. In this sense, the 
way rebel leadership changes hands in most cases substantially overlaps with the way some state leaders lose office 
through the process called "irregular removal" primarily observed in non-democracies (Goemans, Gleditsch, and 
Chiozza, 2009).	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their movement at civil war, state leaders must have a much wider agenda to take into 
consideration (e.g. state of the economy, domestic political conditions, foreign policy etc.). 
Furthermore, these two groups of leaders perform under different structures largely defined by 
(lack of) institutions, and autocratic state leaders can be held accountable domestically to some 
extent for their decisions (Weeks, 2008), while rebel leaders are relatively more autonomous. 
This autonomy of rebel leaders, though, does not come with ease in power. Pearlman 
(2010) contends that: 
 
Even when a movement has an official leadership, a spectrum of persons beyond 
leaders plays a role in shaping the movement’s course of action. Moreover, the 
context in which adherents of a movement make decisions that affect the movement 
is usually multidimensional. They have opinions about issues relating to strategy, 
the proper procedures for reaching collective decisions, how decisions are 
implemented, and how the movement's resources are distributed (p. 201-202). 
 
In this respect, rebel leaders have to elaborate the issues that may stem from their 
relations with rebel elites, including the allocation of material and rewards, distribution of duties, 
and strategy implementation. In other words, rebel leader survival has an in-group dimension as 
well as conflict-level aspects since most rebels tend to attach more importance to their 
movements than their leaders even when they are led by the founder of their organization 
(Tiernay, 2015). 
This chapter aims to develop a theory of rebel leader survival by addressing the 
applicability of the insights provided by the studies on state leaders. Following the theoretical 
discussion, I examine primarily the effects of relative rebel strength and external support on the 
hazard of rebel leader removal. I use new data on rebel leaders to test whether and how these 
variables influence rebel leader survival.  
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The theoretical discussion is broken up into two sections: First, I focus on theories of 
leader survival from the literature on state leaders, and on where the overlapping between state 
and rebel leader survival can be found. The second section discusses the effects of relative rebel 
strength and external support to belligerents on rebel leader survival. 
 
Leader Survival: How Rebel Leaders and Autocrat State Leaders Extend Their 
Tenure 
Studies of political science have recognized the argument that leaders do what they do to 
stay in power. They choose and employ policies and strategies that maximize their tenure. This 
incentive of rebel leaders may look different from the one of state leaders as it is accompanied 
with the rebel leaders’ desire to gain legitimate political power. Achieving that for a rebel leader, 
though, still highly depends on his ability to stay in power and achieve the goals of his rebel 
movement. To put it differently, staying in power for a rebel leader can be considered as a 
prerequisite of gaining legitimate political power. As Chiozza and Goemans (2011) contend, 
leaders choose their policies and strategies based not just on the likelihood but on the costs of 
losing power.17 
The survival-driven leader assumption is enormously influential in the studies on state 
leaders, and the scholarly work concentrates chiefly on the domestic dynamics. In their seminal 
work, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) contend that every political system includes a "winning 
coalition" (W) that refers to "a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset's 
support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the electorate as well 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  They find that over 80% of the leaders who experienced forcible removal from office were either exiled (41%), 
jailed (23%), or killed (17%) (p. 51). It's safe to assume that the hazard of being killed for rebel leaders is much 
higher given that in most cases they lose power due to their death.	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as over the disenfranchised members of the society" (p. 51). Most democratic systems tend to 
have a large W, while non-democracies generally contain a small W. Selectorate theory draws 
the underlying distinction between these two sets of regime types by asserting that leaders in 
large W systems survive by providing more public goods to all members of society, while 
leaders in systems with small W tend to survive by providing private goods and/or rewards to 
only their elites. As Morrow et al. (2008) point out, autocrats center on the purchase of the 
loyalty of key supporters.   
The selectorate theory describes relevant sets of people within any polity. “[…] Nested 
within the residents of all polities is a selectorate and within that there is a winning coalition. 
Leaders, all of whom face challengers who wish to depose them, maintain their coalitions of 
supporters by taxing and spending in ways that allocate mixes of public and private goods.” (de 
Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 37). 
The theory bases its analysis on the assumption that the ultimate goal of any leader is to 
gain and retain power. Leaders use their resources to obtain the combination of public and 
private goods that will best help them to please the W so that their W will remain loyal and 
ensure that they stay in power (de Mesquita et al., 2003). 
The system in which a leader is operating can have a dramatic effect on the type of goods 
that the leader distributes, as well as the ratio of private goods to public goods. In a democracy 
with a large population, the W is extremely large since leaders have to have support of a large 
number of voters to gain power. Given that private goods cost much more per person, the leaders’ 
best interest is to provide a large amount of public goods to keep their large W satisfied. A 
satisfied W continue to keep the leader in power, but due to the fact that the public goods are not 
as motivating as the private goods would be, they are prone to changes in support in case a 
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challenger comes into play who pledges superior public and/or private goods (de Mesquita et al., 
2003). 
Autocratic governments, on the other hand, generate smaller Ws. In this type of 
governmental setting, the W consists only of the few individuals who maintain the leader’s 
power, such as a few financially powerful backers or personal guards to prevent a coup. In this 
case, it would be best interest of the leader to distribute private goods to the few relevant 
individuals that play the most important role in keeping them in power. Thus, as far as the 
selectorate theory suggests, by relying on as few key people to keep them in power as possible, 
leaders follow the primary rule of governing (de Mesquita, 2010). The small size of the group 
motivates the members of the W to sustain their support for their leader so they can carry on 
accessing to private goods. In other words, as long as the W is small and well satisfied with 
private goods, the leader has little incentive to provide public goods to the rest of their 
selectorate (de Mesquita et al., 2003). 
The setting of selectorate theory, and thus its function as a tool for understanding 
authoritarian politics can apply to the intrastate realm to some extent. Naturally, rebel leaders 
may not have a selectorate in the same way as state leaders do since rebels operate under a 
different structure of organization. Furthermore, in most cases, the difference between the 
selectorate and the winning coalition in rebel groups is not as clear-cut as in some autocratic 
states. In autocracies, some leaders “are accountable to a restrictive group of interests, while 
others are accountable to a selectorate composed of members of the governing apparatus” 
(Gallagher and Hanson, 2014). Rebel leaders, on the other hand, fight their war with a quite 
narrow inner circle consisting of “rebel elites” which, as a group, may stand for the winning 
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coalition in rebel organizations. However, this does not necessarily mean that civil conflicts lack 
a group of people to whom rebel leaders have an incentive and interest in providing public goods.   
Rebel groups generally claim public goods as their goals, with concessions, regime 
change, autonomy, democratization, redistribution etc. (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007). Yet, 
providing public goods (especially security) to civilians during the conflict may play a key role 
in the course of civil war, although rebels are mostly restricted to provide the public goods that 
state leaders can offer such as education, health, and welfare programs. In Sri Lanka, 
Prabhakaran, the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), managed to offer a 
considerable extent of public goods to the civilian population, and, in return, enjoyed a mass 
civilian support. Wamba, the leader of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), on the other 
hand, failed to provide security to civilian population in the eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and the organization “suffered a deep crisis of legitimacy as a result” (Mampilly, 2011). 
Therefore, since the fate of rebel leaders are tightly coupled with the fate of their rebellion, 
leaders may need to consider providing public goods to the civilian population even though 
civilians do not have a direct role in selecting rebel leaders. In other words, despite the difference 
in the context and the nature of the relationship, civilians are the most relevant group to being the 
selectorate for rebel leaders.  
Although some victorious rebel elites manage to ascend to the highest state positions 
after the war while others reach only subaltern offices, they all fight for political power. Civil 
wars initiate dynamics of social mobility, so social groups and individuals may rise or fall. 
Depending upon their territorial and temporal nature, civil wars can cause wide-ranging changes 
in the social stratification of a society and its elite structure (Maleseivic, 2010). Rebel groups are 
not an exception of this social dynamic, and the elite formation in rebel groups, therefore, is 
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multidimensional. As in most political structures, the elites in rebel groups rely highly on their 
capital. As Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) conceptualize, elites’ capital takes some different 
forms; each refers to specific means of power or resources. Some elites gain the status simply 
through their economic capital (wealth), which can be crucial for the success of the rebellion. 
Some elites have a strong social capital, which enables them to provide the rebel movement with 
their personal relations, informal networks, or external ties. Cultural capital can be another form 
that some rebel elites offer to the rebellion, which consists of education, relevant training and/or 
background, recruitment skills, and efficient strategies (Bourdieu, 1998).   
Rebel elites generally gain prominence within the rebellion in their leaders' early tenure. 
Thus, rebel leaders have to heavily consider keeping their small W "happy" throughout the war 
in order to extend their time in power. Rebel leaders can do this in two ways. In conflicts where 
they fight against resource-rich governments, or where their rebellion is financially supported by 
a third-party, they can allow their elites to benefit from the rewards that take place during 
conflict (Humphreys, 2005). Thus, financial rewards may secure the elite support to rebel leaders 
and help them to get more consolidated in power.   
However, most rebel groups are not blessed with economic endowments, and rebel 
leaders may have to rely on commitments where their ability to provide financial rewards falls 
short. When rebels can manage at least not to lose--to achieve negotiated settlements or military 
victory, the post-war order may give the rebel elites significant opportunities for political careers. 
Hence, when rebel leaders are not able to grant financial rewards to their elites, they tend to "sell 
the future" to maintain the elite support for their leadership. In these cases, the larger portion of 
private rewards for Ws is mostly expected to be the loot of victory (Weinstein, 2005). 
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Despite its importance, gaining support of their small Ws is not enough for rebel leaders 
to stay in power. To survive, they need an arsenal of arms and ammunition; a group of 
determined recruits to mount and maintain the rebellion; resources to feed, equip, and finance the 
insurgency; and training to improve the effectiveness of rebel soldiers (Weinstein, 2005). Rebel 
leaders mostly struggle to implement all these conditions during the war, and, at this point, 
external factors may come into play. 
The research on state leader survival has some insights to offer on this external aspect of 
survival as well. Relying highly on selectorate theory, a growing body of literature directly deals 
with the link between a form of external support (aid) and leader survival. A number of studies 
overlap in the reasoning they exhibit to support their argument that leaders who are responsible 
only to a small W, and thus motivated for extended tenure through providing private rewards, 
tend to be appreciative of external resource flows (Lai and Morey, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith, 2007; 2009).  An extension of the selectorate model demonstrates that autocratic leaders 
are assisted by external aid only in the long term (Kono and Montinola, 2009). 
The most direct means by which external support could benefit leaders is by supplying 
additional resources for application to their common survival-seeking activities. A static view of 
institutions contributes to this insight by suggesting that autocratic leaders will benefit more from 
external support. As they are less constrained by institutional checks, and responsible to a narrow 
population, external support applies directly into the tenure extension activities of small Ws 
(Licht, 2010).18 
In addition to these in-group and external dynamics of rebel leader survival, it should be 
noted, again, that rebel leaders' tenure highly depends on the course of conflict. Tiernay (2015) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Democratic leaders, however, institutionally constrained and obligated to at least a plurality of the voting 
population, have relatively little to gain and much to lose from external assistance (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). 	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finds that civil wars are four times more likely to end when the rebel leader of a rebel group is 
captured or killed, and that most rebel groups do not suffer from substantial military failure prior 
to leadership removal. These findings reveal that governments tend to attach a priority to 
capturing or killing rebel leaders to end the conflict. In juxtaposition to their in-group concerns 
regarding their tenure, therefore, rebel leaders also have to be successful in the battlefield to 
secure their leadership. While doing so, most importantly, they have to stay alive.   
Although the literature on state leaders has been expanded over recent decades, the 
growing literature on civil conflict largely lacks an empirical investigation of rebel leader 
survival. Individual-level variation, and rebel leaders in particular, have been largely 
underemphasized. Hence, a focus on the survival-driven incentives of individual leaders holds 
much promise for an analysis of rebel leaders. 
I, therefore, develop theoretical arguments in the next section by highlighting the 
potential effects of external support to belligerents and relative rebel strength on rebel leader 
survival. I test my arguments on a dataset of 708 rebel leader-years covering 154 separate leaders 
from 1991 to 2008, estimating a Cox proportional hazard model that accounts for the hazard of 
losing power for rebel leaders throughout the civil conflict. The analysis suggests that 
government-biased external support and relative rebel strength play a significant role in the 
hazard of rebel leader turnover. 
 
External Support, Rebel Strength, and Rebel Leader Survival 
My theoretical argument draws on the assumptions of selectorate theory (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2005). I assume that rebel leaders are rational and survival-driven, acting so as to 
stay in power as long as possible. Since their secondary, individual-level political goals cannot 
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be obtained without this prior condition, leaders always have the incentive to decrease their risk 
of losing power. These survival-seeking incentives gets stronger as the risk of losing power 
increases since a removal would be highly likely to result in being killed or jailed. In most cases, 
we might expect rebel leaders to be killed or heavily punished for their "crimes", rather than 
fleeing safely, while low-level combatants may be allowed to reintegrate into society.19 
All leaders owe their tenure to a winning coalition whose support is critical to overcome 
political challenges (e.g. fighting a civil war). As the selectorate theory points out, the size of this 
winning coalition is determined by states’ political institutions. Given that rebel groups are 
relatively smaller organizations with smaller winning coalitions, the survival problem, for all 
rebel leaders, involves a satisfying setting that maximizes the utility of the winning coalition 
through private goods and/or rewards. 
Most empirical analyses of leader survival, such as those focusing on winning coalitions, 
mainly concentrate on domestic variables. They put the emphasis on institutions, state capacity, 
economic indicators, and time in office (Bienen and van de Walle, 1992; Londregan and Poole, 
1990; Chiozza and Choi, 2003). Recent scholarship attributes explanatory power to leaders' 
experience for investigation of conflict behavior (Gelpi and Grieco, 2001; Chiozza and Choi, 
2003; Wolford, 2007). The literature on diversionary war, rally effects, and casualties posit that 
decisions to involve in conflict affect leader duration through domestic approval (Mitchell and 
Prins, 2004; Lai and Reiter, 2005). Research in this vein reveals the conditioning of the negative 
effect of military and economic conflict on leader survival by target regime type (Chiozza and 
Goemans 2003, 2004; McGillivray and Smith 2006). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Some scholars argue that rebel leaders have the resources and connections to safely flee the area if defeat 
becomes inevitable, while the low-level combatants are at the mercy of the victors (Kinder and Hilgemann, 1978). 
Ultimately, this is an empirical question that has yet to be addressed by the literature.	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Despite the clear influences of internal forces, however, plenty of room remains for 
external factors to affect leader tenure. In many cases, some in-group dynamics of rebel 
leadership, such as providing rewards to elites, can be driven in part by out-group factors. Civil 
conflicts are not always conducted on a domestic basis and often have no precise temporal or 
spatial boundaries. Although the concept "civil conflict" seems to refer to some sort of domestic 
process, internal conflicts often have a significant external dimension attached to them. Most 
civil conflicts, even those that have been driven mostly by internal forces (e.g. Peru, Lebanon) 
are not entirely exempt from external influences (Weinstein, 2007; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). 
They tend to be conditioned in various degrees by regional and global factors, as well as third-
party involvement/support, at multiple stages of their transition process. They can attract third-
party attention and intervention, and transform to internationalized conflicts where the 
borderlines of conflict are not always as clear-cut as in interstate wars (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, 
and Joyce, 2008; Regan, 1998; 2002).  
No matter in what form, it is explicit that the prominence of external support in civil 
conflicts could not be neglected. Employing a fairly generic definition of civil conflicts and of 
external involvements, Regan (2002) demonstrates that 89 (out of 138) civil conflicts since 
World War II had at least one third party intervention, and that within these 89 conflicts there 
were a total of 190 cases of individual involvements. 
A large and growing body of research has emphasized the importance of understanding 
both the causes and the effects of external involvement in civil war (Regan, 2002; Balch-Lindsay 
and Enterline, 2000; Collier et al. 2003; Bapat, 2006; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, 
2011). Scholars of civil conflict have demonstrated that external support for sides changes the 
dynamics of the conflict itself. Civil wars with external involvement typically last longer (Regan, 
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2002), lead to more fatalities (Heger and Salehyan, 2007), and are more difficult to settle through 
negotiations (Cunningham, 2010). Thus, external involvements, in a sense, introduce new actors 
into the civil conflict with interests and strategies of their own, changing the underlying dynamic 
of the conflict for both state and non-state actors (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, 2011). 
Investigating how external support influences rebel leaders' risk of losing power is therefore 
critical for understanding how some of the externally driven dynamics of civil war provide 
formidable challenges for rebel leaders to overcome to extend their tenure.  
Most rebel movements lack the necessary economic and military strength to challenge 
governments effectively. Although diamonds and other lootable resources play a key role in 
many civil conflicts that motivate the literature (e.g., Angola, Congo, and Sierra Leone), some 
rebel groups have to organize their rebellion in environments lacking an economic base (e.g., 
Ethiopia, Uganda, and Rwanda). In these contexts, rebel leaders face the logistical demands of 
insurgency through means other than the mobilization of material wealth. Then, they have to 
employ appeals to ethnic or class solidarity, nationalist sentiments, and local social ties to 
determine the recruits and resources necessary to fight against the governments (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2001).  
Rebel leaders' ability of making use of any support that an external party provides can be 
pivotal for the success of a rebellion organization since resources strengthen the hand of the 
insurgency relative to the government. Being supported by an external party surely bolsters the 
resistance and morale of rebels (Collier et al. 2003). Besides, external support may allow rebel 
leaders to provide private rewards to their small Ws, which is crucial to decrease the hazard of 
removal. Similarly, rebel groups enjoying external support are more likely to be able to provide 
public goods to the civilian population located in the areas controlled by rebels.  
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External support to rebels, therefore, can play a crucial role in the chance of success for 
both rebel leaders and their rebellion by alleviating these difficulties that rebel leaders have to 
overcome. We can thereby expect that having external support to their rebel group may have a 
negative effect on the hazard of rebel leader removal. I propose the following hypothesis for 
empirical testing: 
 
Hypothesis 1. All else being equal, when rebel movements are supported by an external party, 
the hazard of losing power for their leaders decreases. 
 
The flip side of coin, fighting against a government, which is externally supported, 
however, can easily be a risk-increaser for rebel leaders. In general, governments have much 
more military capability than rebels, and that is why they mostly do not need external support. 
When the balance of power approaches to parity, though, governments are more likely to 
appreciate third-party involvements. Once supported externally, governments tend to look for 
solutions to conflicts in fighting rather than negotiated settlements (Regan and Aydin, 2006), 
which increases the hazard of losing power for rebel leaders. 
Furthermore, government-biased external support somehow influences the initial 
relationship within the conflict in favor of governments who already hold a structural advantage 
over rebel groups. Most civil conflicts are framed by juridical sovereignty, and even stronger 
rebels face certain limitations as government incumbents control the capital.20 Most governments 
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  Andre Matsangaissa, the first leader of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), which fought a civil 
war against the government in Mozambique from 1975 to 1992, did not survive very long despite the explicit and 
strong external support to his rebellion by South Africa, Kenya, Rhodesia, and Malawi. Nordstrom (1992) even 
describes the RENAMO as a particularly lethal rebel group formed by foreign powers intent on destabilizing the 
country, and responsible for over 90 percent of the brutality committed.  Moreover, the RENAMO was a well-
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are blessed with legitimacy and sovereignty, an extensive resource base, and infrastructure 
giving them a structural upper hand against rebels (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). 
Moreover, even in cases where rebels are stronger than government forces, external 
involvements favoring governments are likely to be driven by interveners’ concerns about 
political and economic instability in the region, which makes it a lot harder for a rebel leader to 
fight the civil war, and increases the risk of turnover (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002; Regan and 
Aydin, 2006).21 As stability-seeker third-parties tend to be after a shorter conflict, and conflicts 
are most likely to come to an end when rebel leaders are captured or killed (Tiernay, 2015), the 
potential military strategies of government forces which are supported by these parties can put 
rebel leaders in danger of arrest or death. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
  
Hypothesis 2. All else being equal, when rebels fight against a government supported by an 
external party, the hazard of losing power for their leaders increases. 
 
The other prospective factor that may drive the variation in rebel leader survival is the 
strength of the rebel group. Conflicts with stronger rebel groups are more likely to be settled 
through a peace agreement, or result in rebel victory (Cunningham et al. 2009; Gent, 2008). 
Stronger rebels are more likely to win battles, pose credible challenges, and, therefore, be in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
established organization with a considerable level of popular support, and quite stronger than the Mozambican 
government militarily (Chingono, 1996).	  21	  Ndikumana and Emizet (2003) argue that in Congo, the government's ability to face the rebellion depended 
almost entirely on its external support more than on its own economic capacity.	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better position to extract concessions from the government (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and 
Salehyan, 2009.)22  
Given that civil conflicts are dyadic interactions between states and rebel groups, 
emphasizing this dyadic component is crucial to accurately assess the dynamics underpinning 
civil conflict (Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala, 2009; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009). In 
this sense, a growing literature on civil conflict recognizes the importance of the influence of 
relative power/capabilities within conflict. The strength of warring parties is related to a wide 
variety of factors, including the military size, equipment, location, experience, and leadership 
structure of an armed force (DeRouen and Sobek, 2004). However, the strength of a warring 
party is relatively less important than its strength in comparison to its opponent (Clayton, 2013). 
The Gambian and Mozambican governments, for example, were militarily weaker than the NRC 
and the RENAMO, and they were backed by the interventions of Nigeria and Zimbabwe, 
respectively, as secondary warring parties.  Yet, when the external forces left the territory of 
target states, the distribution of power became more favorable for the rebels in relation to the 
governments. 
As the balance of power between rebel groups and governments becomes more uneven in 
favor of governments, the likelihood for rebels to face collective action problems increases. 
“Facing a highly unequal balance of capabilities, […] rebels that lack the capacity to provide at 
least nominal protection, if not other selective benefits, to supporters face comparatively greater 
difficulties mobilizing resources” (Wood, 2010). 
Few rebel groups have the mobilization capacity and technological equipment required to 
militarily challenge the state. The PKK in Turkey, for example, and the GIA in Algeria are 	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  However, as the historical record reveals, the success of a rebellion and a rebel leader does not vary together in 
every conflict. Some rebel groups manage to survive for decades despite the frequent leadership turnover (e.g. GIA, 
Hamas, Sendero Luminoso, CNDD-FDD).	  
	   39	  
highly likely to remain relatively weaker than the target states. Nevertheless, rebel groups with 
significant mobilization and organization skills and strong leadership structures are able to reach 
to the point that they compete with incumbent forces (e.g. FAN in Chad, HUK in Philippines).23 
In this sense, we would expect that leaders of rebel groups with larger capabilities are 
more likely to stay in power since the chance of success for those is relatively higher, which 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. All else being equal, when their group is at parity with or stronger than the 
government, the hazard of losing power for rebel leaders decreases. 
 
That some rebel leaders failed to remain in power despite external involvements favoring 
them, and strong groups they lead, raises important questions about the relationship between 
external support, relative rebel strength, and rebel leader survival. If rebel leaders are still at risk 
of losing power even with explicit external support and strong rebel forces, what can be the 
driving factor(s) behind this risk for rebel leaders? Do conflict-oriented characteristics or 
belligerent-oriented notions have more explanatory power? These questions link individual-level 
phenomena to the group/state dynamics of warfare, and are largely ignored by the growing 
literature on civil conflict. 
Following is the presentation of the research design and the empirical data analysis. The 
final part includes a brief discussion of the key findings and future research avenues. 
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  In very rare cases in which the state is notably weak, rebel strength overtops that of the government (e.g. NPFL in 
Liberia).	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Research Design 
The data upon which the hypotheses are tested consist of 708 leader years covering 154 
separate rebel leaders from 1991 to 2008. I collected new data on these leaders from multiple 
resources including databases of prominent leaders, conflict-specific encyclopedias, individual 
biographies, and the UNCTAD reports. The event history data grounding the dataset come from 
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (v.4-2013). The data on external support and battle 
deaths are also extracted from the UCDP External Support Data and the UCDP Battle-Related 
Deaths Dataset (v.5-2013), respectively. The relative rebel strength part of the data comes from 
Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009). 
I use a Cox proportional hazard framework to test the relationship between the variables 
of interest and rebel leader survival. The robustness and advantages of Cox proportional hazards 
are well established (Therneau and Grambsch, 2000; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997, 2004). 
Since the Cox models do not specify a parametric form for the baseline hazard, they produce 
unbiased results under a variety of specifications. The method is also the most common used in 
previous analyses of leadership survival across countries and regime types. (Bienen and van de 
Walle, 1991; Chiozza and Goemans, 2004; Colaresi, 2004). The Cox models make the fewest 
superfluous assumptions about the data (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997, 2004). Hence, they 
are the most logical method for testing the external support theory measures, averting criticisms 
of divergence arising due to model selection. 
The empirical findings are presented as hazard ratios. These represent the proportionate 
increase or decrease in the baseline hazard of a rebel leader losing power. Numbers above 1 
indicate that a one point increase in the independent variable increases the chance of a rebel 
leader's removal. A hazard ratio of 1.11, for instance, indicates that a one point increase in the 
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independent variable increases the probability of a rebel leader's removal by 11 percent. 
Similarly, a score of 0.97 suggests that a one point increase in the independent variable decreases 
the probability of rebel leadership turnover by 3 percent (97 percent of the baseline hazard). 
To test the hypotheses on relative rebel strength, external support and rebel leader 
survival, I estimate a series of hazard models in which the dependent variable measures the 
hazard of losing power for rebel leaders. One extension that is needed to be added to the Cox 
hazard modeling is accounting for nonproportional hazards (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn, 
2003). The Cox hazard model relies on the key assumption of proportional hazards that 
regardless of when it occurs in the event history of a subject, a change in an independent variable 
has an influence on the hazard, which is proportional and constant over time (Chiozza and 
Goemans, 2004). Although this strong assumption might serve analysts well in a large range of 
research, it is also an assumption that should not be granted without any specification checks.  
The effects of independent variables might increase or decrease over time, thereby 
altering the conditions under which a process or an event terminates. Neglecting to control for 
time-varying effects, therefore, might not only lead to a failure in determining the political 
dynamics that underlie leader survival, but also lead to biased and inefficient estimates. Hence, I 
run the relevant specification tests based on the analysis of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals for all 
the models I estimate (Grambsch and Therneau, 1994).24 
The key independent variables, external support to government and external support to 
rebels (binary; 0/1), identify the existence of any form of external support including 
funding/economic support, providing weapons and/or material logistics, offering training and/or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  The Grambsch and Therneau global test employs the maximum of the absolute cumulative summed Schoenfeld 
residuals and tests whether the model as a whole indicates any violation of proportional hazards assumption. 
Harrell's rho, on the other hand, is a statistical test for proportional hazards relying on the Schoenfeld residuals for 
each covariate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).	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expertise, and fighting war as a secondary party by sending troops; while relative rebel strength 
is a binary variable that measures the strength of the rebels in relation to the state, coding the 
existence of rebel groups which are weaker (0) than or at least at parity (1) with governments.25 
I also include a set of control variables standing for the factors that may potentially affect 
rebel leader survival. Civil conflicts are dynamic processes, and the temporal dimension of them 
may highly matter for rebel leader survival. Cumulative intensity, an indicator coming from 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data, takes this dimension into account, and it is therefore 
commonly used in the literature on civil conflict. The variable takes on a value of 1 if the conflict 
ever exceeded 1,000 battle-related deaths since the onset, and 0 otherwise. There is an interaction 
between intensity of conflict and strategies of warfare that rebel leaders choose to employ.  
Number of active rebel groups measures the number of rebel organizations actively 
involved in conflict by fighting against government simultaneously. An increase in the number 
of rebel groups fighting against government might decrease the hazard rate of losing power for 
rebel leaders, since government incumbents would have to deal with more than one rebel 
movements at the same time.  
Besides conflict-oriented factors, some state-related aspects may also influence rebel 
leader survival. The prevailing scholarly wisdom is that states that repress their citizens are the 
most likely to generate dissident violence and to experience a civil war. The regime 
characteristics of states and potential audience costs on government incumbents might matter to 
rebel leaders in that they would try to extort concessions by employing warfare strategies to 
stalemate incumbent states that might in turn make rebel leaders more secure in power. This is 
more likely to happen when incumbent states are not autocracies.  Autocracy variable comes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  The data are extracted from the three-point scale of Cunningham. Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009).  	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from the Polity IV Project that uses institutional characteristics to assign an 
authoritarian/democracy score on a scale from -10 to 10. It is coded 1 if the target state's score is 
below -5, and 0 otherwise.   
 Ethnic divisions play a central role in the literature on civil conflict. However, not all 
ethnically divided countries evolve into civil conflict (Reynal-Querol, 2002). When they do, on 
the other hand, ethnic diversity might be in favor of survival-driven rebel leaders. Ethnically 
motivated conflicts are predominantly due to political rather than economic grievances 
(Sambanis, 2001). When economic expectations of recruits do not impose costs on rebel leaders, 
they might enjoy longer tenures. However, leaders of ethically divided rebel groups can face 
collective action problems and the risk of removal from their position. I control for ethnic 
fractionalization, using data from Fearon and Laitin (2003), measures the probability that two 
randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different groups.  
Finally, oil production per capita includes annual oil production estimates divided by 
population (thousand tons) (Wimmer and Min, 2006). The measure of oil wealth is correlated 
with the onset of civil war (Ross 2004), and it is considered to play a key role in financing 
conflicts. In Angolan civil war, the secure oil rent allowed the MPLA party to wage a long and 
violent civil war against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 
since the 1970s (Billon, 2007). As Ross (2008) points out, "oil wealth often wreaks havoc on a 
country's economy and politics, makes it easier for insurgents to fund their rebellions, and 
aggravates ethnic grievances." On the other hand, whether incumbent states have oil resources 
might affect the strategies that rebel leaders have to employ, thereby influencing the risk of 
losing power for rebel leaders. Oil is likely to make rebel leaders more greedy and aggressive 
since controlling oil resources can allow them to pay off their W. Furthermore, the trajectory of 
	   44	  
civil war in oil-rich countries are likely to persuade rebel leaders that they cannot fully enjoy 
political control, or even political concessions without controlling oil resources adequately. This 
sort of incentive may lead to risky insurgency tactics, which, in turn, may increase the hazard of 
rebel leader removal since oil-dependent states would be much more determined to defend their 
resources. Besides, oil extraction is not an entirely internally driven process. In most conflict-
prone oil-rich countries, the extraction is managed by the multinational corporations having 
strong relationships with state elites based on mutual interests. This may work against rebels, and 
also rebel leaders, in many ways, such as in gaining international support to their movement. 
 
Data Analysis 
I estimate five models: Model 1 assesses the effect of relative rebel strength on rebel 
leader survival. Model 2 focuses on whether, and how, external support to rebel groups 
influences the hazard of rebel leader removal, while Model 3 deals with the potential impact of 
external government-biased support on the risk of losing power for rebel leaders. Model 4 
estimates the overall effects of three key explanatory variables on the hazard of rebel leader 
removal. Finally, the fully specified model, Model 5, includes all explanatory and control 
variables. 
Table 1 reports the findings. The hazard ratios measure the impact of the variables on the 
hazard of losing power. Thus, the hazard ratios larger than 1 imply that as an independent 
variable increases the hazard of rebel leader removal increases and expected time in power 
decreases, while the hazard ratios smaller than 1 imply that as an independent variable increases 
the hazard of losing power for rebel leaders decreases and expected time in power increases. 
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Before discussing the effects of the explanatory variables on the hazard of losing power, I 
briefly mention the inclusion of the time-interaction variables to correct for non-proportionality. 
In Model 2, both the global and the variable-specific tests for non-proportionality yielded large 
and highly significant (p < .024) test statistics, clearly indicating a violation of the proportional 
hazards assumption. In the variable-specific tests for Model 4 and 5, the variable external 
support to rebels appears to cause the variable-specific violation (p < .054 and p < .056, 
respectively), while the global tests did not show any evidence of non-proportionality for the 
models as a whole. 
I correct for non-proportionality by interacting the offending covariates with the natural 
log of time in the models 2, 4, and 5. The relative size and sign of the interaction and offending 
variable’s coefficients indicate the rate at which the variable’s effect moves over time. When the 
interaction term has the same sign as the offending variable’s coefficient, the initial effect 
magnifies over time. “A small interaction term coefficient relative to the constitutive term 
coefficient indicates slow change. When the coefficients have opposing signs, exponentiating the 
ratio of the coefficients provides the value of time when the estimated effect flips from positive 
to negative or vice versa” (Licht, 2011, p. 235). 
Turning our attention back to the effects of explanatory variables presented in Table 1, 
we can notice that the effect of relative rebel strength on the risk of losing power for rebel 
leaders just slightly fails to be significant (with a p-value of 0.11). As the hazard ratio indicates, 
leading a rebel group which is at parity with or stronger than the government decreases the 
probability of a rebel leader's removal by 80 percent. Although the direction of the effect is in 
line with the Hypothesis 3, we must note that the effect is not statistically significant.  
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In Model 2, external rebel-biased support appears to have a negative effect on rebel 
leader survival. However, this coefficient is not statistically significant. As Table 1 presents, 
external government-biased support appears as the only variable with a statistically significant 
effect when estimated in a model on its own. The hazard ratio in Model 3 reveals that the hazard 
of removal for rebel leaders increases 2.6 (hr of 2.59) times when the government has externally 
support, and this effect is highly significant with a p-value of 0.002. This finding shows a very 
strong support for the Hypothesis 2. To be more precise about the significance of this effect, 
though, we should see how the variable performs in the fully specified model with the other 
explanatory variables included.  
Model 4 includes all three key explanatory variables. The first thing to notice in the 
model is that the effects of the variables measuring the relative rebel strength and external 
government-biased support remain substantially identical across Model 4 and the variable-
specific models. The hazard ratio and the statistical significance of the effect by relative rebel 
strength slightly changes, so that being at parity with or stronger than the government decreases 
the hazard of losing power for rebel leaders by 81%, and this effect misses being of statistically 
significance very slightly (p < 0.105). The variable measuring the effect of external support to 
government also remains almost identical: The hazard of removal for rebel leaders increases 2.6 
(hr of 2.62) times when they fight against a government externally supported, and this effect is 
statistically significant (p < 0.002). As in Model 2, the variable of external support to rebels 
appears to have a positive effect on the hazard of rebel leader removal. However, the effect is, 
again, far away from being statistically significant with a p-value of 0.80. The time-interaction 
term as well shows a very similar effect, and fails to be statistically significant (p < 0.24), 
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suggesting that rebel-biased external support has no statistically significant effect on rebel leader 
survival.  
Finally, Table 1 also reports the findings of the fully specified model that includes all key 
explanatory and control variables. The major change occurs with the effect of the variable 
measuring the strength of rebels in relation to the government, as its negative impact on the 
hazard of removal for rebel leaders becomes statistically significant (p < 0.097). The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for relative rebel strength indicates that leading a rebel 
organization which is at parity with or stronger than the government decreases the probability of 
a rebel leader's removal by 82 percent. This finding supports the Hypothesis 3, and suggests that 
not leading a rebel group with very limited capabilities allows rebel leaders to stay in power for a 
longer period of time. Even when rebels are stronger than government forces, rebel leaders' 
tenure, of course, can still be at stake due to the structural disadvantages faced by rebels or some 
other external involvements favoring governments. Figure 1 presents the estimated baseline 
hazard function for rebel leaders depending on their organization’s strength compared to the 
government.26 The figure demonstrates that, all else being equal, the chances of losing power for 
a rebel leader who leads forces that can cope with government's are quite smaller than those lead 
relatively weaker forces, and this effect is consistent over time. 
As in the RENAMO example, leading a strong rebel group may not be enough for a rebel 
leader to survive. However, this finding, at least partly, explains what observe in many civil 
conflicts in which rebel leaders stay in power for a very long time. Aside from some well-known 
cases, such as Kagame (Rwandan Patriotic Front/RPF), Prince Johnson (Independent National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia/INPFL) or Charles Taylor (National Patriotic Front of Liberia/NPFL), 	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  For each figure, the estimated hazard function is calculated based on the modal values for discrete variables, and 
the mean values for the continuous variable.	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in Djibouti, Ahmed Dini Ahmed led the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy 
(FURD) for over a decade mostly relying on the strength of his rebel organization.  Likewise, 
Mohamed Farah Aidid led the United Somalia Congress-Somali National Alliance  (USC/SNA) 
for a long time until the rebels forced the UN forces to abandon the country in 1995.  
   
 
Turning to the finding corresponding to external support to government, the positively 
signed and statistically significant coefficient indicates that third-party support for the 
government increases the risk that a rebel leader will be removed. The hazard increases 2.4 (hr of 
2.39) times when rebels face externally supported governments, all else being equal, and this 
effect is statistically significant at the level of p < 0.015. As Model 3 and 4, the fully specified 
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model, too, suggests that external support to government is strongly and positively correlated 
with the hazard of rebel leader removal as anticipated in the second hypothesis. Figure 2 
demonstrates this effect.   
 
 
 
The al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia stands out as a good example of this direction of 
the effect of government-biased third-party support. Aden Hashi Farah (Ayro)’s leading ability 
was highly restricted as the Somalia government received a considerable support from the 
African Union and the U.S. It was a gradual loss of capabilities. However, it did took only 
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months for the government to paralyze rebels, followed by a U.S. airstrike killing Farah who was 
replaced by Sheikh Muktar Robow.  
The performance of the remaining covariates reported in Table 1 offers further insight 
into rebel leader survival. Oil production per capita appears as the only variable whose effect is 
statistically significant. This finding suggests that a 1,000 tons increase in the oil production per 
capita increases the hazard of rebel leader removal by 28%, all else being equal, and this effect is 
significant with a p-value of 0.030. As Figure 3 presents, oil production has a strong, consistent, 
and positive effect on the hazard of losing power for rebel leaders. The hazard evidently 
increases, as the production level exceeds 3,000 tons/year. This effect may stem from an aspect 
of oil production related to both sides of the conflict. On the one hand, leading a rebel movement 
against an oil-rich country can be a difficult task for two reasons. First, oil-dependency may 
require a more concentrated and reckless counterinsurgency strategy on the government’s end. 
Second, unless captured by rebels, oil resources can remain as a trump card of the government 
that they can efficiently use to obtain external support. On the other hand, given the importance 
of oil resources for the government, rebel leaders may choose to attack aggressively to seize the 
resources at the expense of a very high risk of death or defeat.   
The effects of external rebel-biased support and the time-interaction term do not 
substantially change in the fully specified model. Having external support to their groups 
increases the hazard of losing power for rebel leaders. This positive effect on the hazard, though, 
diminishes over time. However, both hazard ratios again fail to be statistically significant (p < 
0.73 and  p < 0.23, respectively.) In this sense, as well as in the previous models, Model 5 does 
not provide any empirical support for the Hypothesis 1. 
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External resources may allow some rebel leaders to satisfy their small Ws, which in turn 
may consolidate their leadership. Civil conflicts, however, are not static processes.27 Some other 
factors stemming from the dynamic nature of conflict may condition the effect of rebel-biased 
external support on rebel leader survival. While the presence of external economic resources 
makes it possible for leaders to recruit on the basis of short-term rewards, this kind of rebel 
groups tend to be flooded with opportunistic recruits who show very little commitment to the 	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  Politics, as the historical record and evidence suggest, rarely stands still. Leaders' survival is not an exception, 
and their risk of losing power varies over time (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Wright, 2008; Chiozza and 
Goemans, 2004). Also, they face different kinds of challenges and pressures at different stages of their careers (Licht, 
2010). 	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long-term strategies of the rebellion (Weinstein, 2005). If the form of the external support is not 
economic, rebel leaders have to face a more difficult recruitment task, where they tend to attract 
new joiners by relying on social relations to make credible promises about the private rewards 
that will be the loot of victory. In this sense, external assistance may appear as an attracting 
feature to recruits, while it probably attracts those who are not well suited to the long-term goal 
of capturing state power. 
The variable of cumulative intensity measuring intensity of conflict also fails to reach 
statistical significance. Conflict’s being exceeded 1,000 battle-related deaths ever since the onset 
increases the hazard for rebel leaders by 39% (p < 0.46). Ethno-linguistic fractionalization and 
number of ethno-political groups within society decreases the hazard of leader change by 45% 
and 1%, respectively, while fighting the rebellion under an autocratic regime increases the 
hazard of removal for rebel leaders by 42%. The effects for all these three variables are not 
statistically significant. 
As to the relative performance of the variables in estimating rebel leader tenure, it is safe 
to assert that, among the key variables of interest, external support to government and relative 
rebel strength perform quite well. Rebel leaders, indeed, are less likely to survive when they 
have to face a government backed by a third-party. In the interstate realm, this finding suggests 
that states can employ the strategy of intervention as a trump card to be able to strengthen their 
hands against the home state. Likewise, strength of rebels compared to incumbents matters as 
well. This finding at least partly explains the typical government behavior that they aim to keep 
rebels away from natural resources, agriculture-rich areas, and other potential human resources 
of which rebels may take advantage.   
 
	   54	  
Conclusion 
Despite the growing scholarly interest on leaders in conflict studies, rebel groups, as 
entities, and rebel leaders, as decision-making actors, have been largely overlooked. The 
dimensions of civil conflict related to rebel groups have been examined in context with many 
determinants, but not with the individuals who found, organize, and lead rebellions, even though 
they are highly likely to have individual-level impacts on conflict processes as they are only 
slightly, if any, constrained by institutional checks and norms. I make an initial effort to 
underline this gap in this chapter. 
To do so, I examine the factors that influence the hazard of rebel leader removal by 
considering rebel leaders as survival-seeking actors of civil conflict. I turn to a literature 
conceptualizing state leader survival, and focus on the potential overlapping between autocratic 
state leaders and rebel leaders in terms of their survival-driven actions and preferences. Drawing 
on the insights provided by this literature, I formulate a set of hypotheses associating two 
dimensions civil conflicts to the hazard of losing power for rebel leaders: external support by a 
third-party, and relative rebel strength. 
To test whether these hypotheses are supported empirically, I carry out a survival analysis 
on a sample of 154 rebel leaders collected for the period 1991-2008. Through a Cox proportional 
hazards modeling, the empirical findings reveal that government-biased external support and 
relative rebel strength are correlated with the hazard of losing power for rebel leaders, and these 
empirical findings are statistically significant. Fighting against an externally supported 
government appeared as the factor that indicates the highest risk for rebel leaders' tenure. Being 
at parity with or stronger than government forces, on the other hand, decreases the hazard of 
rebel leader removal. The other potential scenario for the external support, the existence of a 
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third-party that supports rebels, does not appear as statistically significant. Aside from its 
significance, though, the Cox model indicates mixed results for this variable. External support to 
rebels increases the hazard for rebel leaders. However, this effect turns to the opposite as time 
goes by, and external rebel-biased support favors rebel leaders in the long-run. The only other 
factor showing statistical significance is oil production per capita in the state, which is positively 
correlated with the hazard of removal.     
Employing rebel leaders as the unit-of-analysis is by-product of a new and interesting 
outgrowth of the wider literature on the "rebels." As my findings suggest, a literature on rebel 
leaders can be interesting enough to warrant our attention in a world where more than two dozen 
rebel leaders are operating at any time. Future research will certainly require better-specified 
models and probably more sophisticated methods. It would be also interesting to conduct such 
analysis with better data covering a lot more rebel leaders from a wider time frame. Individual 
characteristics of rebel leaders, such as military/educational background, ethnic roots, personality, 
age, incentives etc., would provide a much more fruitful database for further empirical 
investigation. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
REBEL LEADER TENURE AND CIVILIAN 
VICTIMIZATION IN AFRICAN CIVIL WARS, 1991-2008 
 
The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) killed 1279 
civilians in Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) in four months following the handover of 
rebel leadership. Until then, however, the ADFL had not targeted civilians. The prominent extant 
theories of civilian victimization would lead us to believe that the reasons behind this suddenly 
increased bloodshed are the informational asymmetries, and the struggle for controlling 
territories and population (Kalyvas, 2004, 2006), or the insurgent capacity (Wood, 2010)28. Some 
would also suggest that rebels’ desire to improve their bargaining position with the incumbents 
(Lake, 2002) or to bolster ethnic cohesion and promote mobilization (Byman, 1998) could 
explain the increased rebel violence. When the young leader Joseph Kabila came to power upon 
the assassination of his father, however, the control zone of the group was already carved out, 
and Kabila did not necessarily need to target more civilians to control any territory or population. 
Besides, he took over a strong organization with considerable military forces fighting against the 
Rwanda-Uganda alliance. Furthermore, the bargaining process had already failed before Kabila 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Wood suggests that violence is a function of insurgent capacity and selective benefits that insurgents manipulate 
to gain support. In this context, we would expect leaders of weak rebel groups facing collective action problems to 
have an incentive to target civilians since they lack the capacity to provide sufficient benefits to entice loyalty. 
	   57	  
came to power, and there was no concern about ethnic cohesion or mobilization either (Wilson, 
2007). However, the ADFL still killed civilians just after the leadership changed.  
The current research on civil war, and civilian victimization in particular tend to assume 
that government and rebel forces are unitary actors. Considering the complex nature of rebellion 
and the pivotal role of leaders in rebel actions, however, this approach seems overly reductive. 
Yet, no extant study takes account of the internal dynamics within rebel organizations in 
particular that are relevant to the understanding of victimization. Addressing the relationship 
between rebel leaders’ tenure and violence against civilians in African civil wars between 1991 
and 2008, this chapter suggests that the individual leadership, as one of the internal dynamics 
within rebellion, matters crucially in one-sided violence sustained by rebel groups against 
civilians.  
Rebel leader tenure represents the endogenous efficacy of leaders as the key decision-
makers, and, therefore, their individual-level influence on targeting civilians. New rebel leaders 
who have to face both internal and external threats to their nascent leadership, which makes it 
difficult for them to stamp the authority on their subjects and to earn the government’s respect as 
a formidable rival, should be more likely to target civilians strategically in order to overcome 
these threats. Experienced leaders, by contrast, are likely to abstain from civilian killings since 
they successfully exhibited authority over their forces and proved their adequacy as a rebel 
leader; thus, they can have a wider range of strategic options to employ against government 
rather than bearing the negative externalities of victimization such as losing the civilian support.  
The chapter proceeds in five steps. The next part reviews extant civil war theories 
focusing on civilian victimization and the individual-level influence of rebel leadership. The 
subsequent part presents the theory. The potential impact of rebel leadership tenure on killing 
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civilians is framed in the context of an internal level of competition, and this endogenous 
mechanism of decision-making in rebel groups is unpacked by addressing its relationship with 
violence against civilians. The research design follows, and the next section provides the results 
of the empirical analysis of the hypothesis, and the following section concludes the chapter.   
 
Individual-level influence in civil war and civilian victimization 
The current theories of civilian victimization mostly lack individuals as primary 
explanations. Scholars tend to portray individuals only as the civilian victims of violence in civil 
war, making them objects rather than subjects of the violence (Kalyvas 2006, 389-90). When 
they do take individuals into account, on the other hand, the individual-level influence on the 
conflict, if any, mostly dissolves into the group-level effects. In other words, civil war—and 
civilian victimization- studies suffer from disregarding the fact that leaders do play an irrefutable 
role individually in –especially rebels’- decision-making processes which lead to the action of 
killing civilians (Lichbach 1995, 8). 
Grievances, third-party interventions, economic growth, massive population dislocations, 
refugee flows, and colonial policies are some of the factors influencing intrastate conflicts. Civil 
war, as a process, however, consists of complex mechanisms that require further scholastic 
attention on intrastate conflict behavior, which is often determined by individuals’ attitudes and 
actions (Walter 2009, 127). Therefore, civilian victimization by rebels demands a deeper 
investigation of the micro-level leadership influence. The social and political identities, strategies, 
and preferences of rebel leaders may get highly influential in the course of civil wars. The profile 
of a rebel group’s membership or a rebel leader’s (in)ability of making effective decisions can 
shape almost all stages of a civil conflict (Weinstein 2007, 10).  
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Despite the relatively limited attention they have attracted so far, the individual-level 
effects are not entirely absent from the civil war research. While some studies seeking answers to 
broad questions investigate why individuals choose to participate in civil wars (Gurr, 1970; Tilly, 
1978; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008; Blattman and Miguel, 2010), others go further by 
analyzing their direct or indirect role in civilian victimization (Walter, 2009; Valentino, 2004; 
Goemans, Gleditcsch, and Chiozza, 2009; Weinstein, 2007). Furthermore, an increasing number 
of studies contends and statistically demonstrates that the use of violence against civilians is not 
always driven by power asymmetries between the sides, but also stems from the incentives that 
armed groups offer to leaders. Referring to the principal-agent literature developed in industrial 
organization, this alternative view conceives of one-sided violence as the product of a lack of 
control by the leader or the predominant recruitment of soldiers whose primary motive is 
economic gain (Azam, 2002; Weinstein, 2005, 2007; Mitchell, 2009). However, the existing 
empirical studies perceive civilian-killing strategies as largely inefficient, attributing the action to 
the lack of control by the leaders (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006) or the recruitment of 
opportunistic killers instead of soldiers who are devoted to the long-term aspirations of the rebel 
organization (Weinstein, 2005, 2007). 
Like the individual-level influence, leaders’ tenure is also not completely missing from 
the body of civil war research. The findings of some recent studies specifically control for state 
leaders’ tenure and suggest that governments with longer-tenured leaders are more likely to 
respond to rebel violence with counter-violence, especially in separatist rebellions (Walter 2009, 
91), and that a higher risk of losing office increases the probability of civil war (Chiozza, 
Gleditcsch, and Goemans 2004, 20). Despite the existence of these works, the literature lacks 
studies analyzing the direct role of rebel leaders’ tenure in violence against civilians.  
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The commonly held view that individual leaders can and do play a decisive role in the 
causal process of mass killing is fundamental for this chapter and constitutes the analytical 
starting point. Bloody episodes of violence against civilians, as some assert, would never have 
occurred without the instigation of specific leaders (Valentino 2004, 61). In some cases, the 
victimization of civilians is based on leaders’ simple opportunity cost calculations (Schneider 
2009, 2), while in other cases it is closely related to their efforts to set in place mechanisms to 
shape and control the behavior of combatants (Weinstein 2007, 127). 
In line with the growing literature attaching importance to the role of leaders in civilian 
victimization, this chapter draws attention to the fact that individuals cannot be treated as 
uninfluential or passive actors of armed civil conflicts. Individuals, on the contrary, often play a 
key role in both the onset and outcome of conflicts by organizing, fighting, manipulating, and 
most importantly, leading an insurgency. Although conflict decision making and actions taken 
during wartime are shaped and constrained by institutions and the conflict environment, 
individuals are the fundemental actors in civil wars. In this sense, I suggest that individuals 
should be integrated into theories of civil war, and of civilian victimization in particular. 
 
Rebel leader tenure and civilian victimization 
Given the importance of evaluating the individual-level influences on targeting civilians, 
I argue that rebel leadership tenure plays a key role in the level of violence to which rebels resort. 
I suggest that intentional civilian killings by rebels in civil war are determined in part by rebel 
leaders’ tenure in power, depending both on an in-group demonstration effect and rebel leaders’ 
tendency of considering these actions as a beginning of insurgency.  
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It is not such a difficulty to overcome for a rebel leader in a civil war to rely on people at 
his disposal whom he does not have an absolute authority over.29 The military organization has 
to be disciplined enough to enforce a common rebel strategy. In this sense, we can assume that 
the longer rebel leaders’ tenure, the stronger the signal of their dominance, control, and authority 
over their soldiers. Victimizing civilians, at this point, can serve as an introductory challenge in 
rebel leaders’ career, and, as Schneider (2009) argues, most of them actually see targeting 
civilians as an introduction to battlefield activities.  
Rebel leaders’ tenure is also closely related to the extent of strategic options that they 
have at their disposal to intensify their in-group authority, and one such strategic option is the 
targeting of civilians. Killing civilians, however, would not be a beneficial option for the longer-
tenured leader in terms of demonstration and authority implementation. The longer-tenured 
leader who already has an established authority on his subjects, is more likely to employ 
strategies focusing on winning the rebellion. For the leader, targeting civilians intentionally at 
this stage would be not only costly—losing public support, or the risk of prosecution once the 
rebellion is over, but also strategically unnecessary because of his already-implemented authority. 
The shorter-tenured leader, however, is more likely to be expected to prove his competence --or 
power to hurt- through bloodshed, and he can entirely concentrate on winning the rebellion only 
after overcoming the authority implementation problem. 
At this point, I need to clarify how targeting civilians signals a rebel leader’s authority or 
control over the group to his subordinates. How can a massacre of civilians create an authority-
based relationship between potentially disloyal rebels and their leaders? In other words, how 
does killing the out-group people cause authority implementation in the in-group? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Since most rebel leaders are male, male pronouns will be employed when an individual actor is mentioned.	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A body of literature points out that killing civilians is a less riskier tactic of insurgency 
for rebels than choosing to fight in battlefield, as civilians are easier targets. This is a comparison 
statement for which strong empirical support has been provided (Kalyvas, 2006; Kresp and 
Wallace, 2011; Hultman et al., 2013). This, however, does not necessarily imply that resorting to 
violence against civilians is not risky at all. As we observed in the Libya case, during civil 
conflicts global powers and international organizations tend to consider the security of civilians 
as their top-priority. In many cases, they do not hesitate to use a threat of force against both sides 
if civilians are in danger of being targeted intentionally by either side.30 
The potential risks that killing civilians may bring to rebel leaders are not limited to third-
party threats. In most states, the post-conflict consequences for defeated rebels differ on whether 
they intentionally killed civilians during the conflict, even if they manage to escape from judging 
by international courts. Those who did not target civilians have a higher chance of getting away 
with several years in prison, while those who killed civilians are likely to face trials bringing life 
sentence or death penalty.31    
Taking this sort of risks into consideration, choosing to kill civilians cannot be treated as 
a completely unrisky action. As rebel leaders seek to establish a ground for their in-group 
authority, and for their overall leadership, in their early-tenure, targeting civilians can be risky 
enough to demonstrate that they are reckless, determined, and dedicated to lead the rebellion.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  As NATO took over control of airstrikes in Libya, and the Obama administration considered new steps to tip the 
balance of power in the country, the coalition told the rebels that if they endanger civilians, they will not be shielded 
from possible bombardment by NATO planes and missiles, just as the government’s forces had been punished (New 
York Times, March 31, 2011).   31	  In 2006, the founder of Peru’s Shining Path; in 2009, three former leaders of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF); and, finally, in 2014, a leftist guerilla commander in Guatemala were sentenced to life in prison by the 
courts of their countries mainly for targeting civilians during wartime. In 2014, rebel leaders in Bangladesh and 
Sudan were sentenced to death with similar charges.  
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Before unpacking these assumptions, to establish the ground for the following, it would 
also be plausible to mention a different level of competition distinct from the one to which the 
current civil war research addresses. Most of the civil war studies tend to approach the civilian 
victimization as a war-like rivalry and competition between governments and rebel groups. They 
compete for recruitment (Gates, 2002; Weinstein, 2005; Lyall, 2009), public support (Buhaug, 
2006; Lounsbery and Cook, 2011), control of resources and strategic territories (Ross, 2004; 
Kalyvas, 2006), and third-party support (Regan, 1998; Metternich, 2011). Civil wars, however, 
are also the setting for a completely different level of competition emerging inside of rebel 
groups, which often have to face a handover of leadership. Although civil conflicts can 
potentially affect the government leaders’ future tenure as well, this kind of competition is 
almost inevitable in rebel groups since rebel leaders have to deal with the risk of death or capture. 
In cases of death, resignation, or dismissal of a rebel leader, the leadership competition emerging 
between rebel elites may lead the group to target civilians during the fledgling period of the new 
leader where the challenge of maintaining authority and lack of experience hurts his strategic 
flexibility. In this context, this rigorous competition would compel the new leader to use a strong 
arm against civilians to demonstrate to the rebel elites that he is qualified and atrocious enough 
to be the leader. The following will build on the given potential motives behind rebel leaders’ 
decision to victimize civilians.  
Most rebel groups are essentially autocratic organizations. Understanding accountability 
is not quite obvious in the autocratic context, since most autocratic regimes lack formal 
mechanisms for selecting and removing leaders (Weeks, 2007). However, as Schultz (2001) puts, 
“while the lack of institutionalized mechanisms for removing undesired leaders [in autocracies] 
means that removal is relatively rare, it also means that the associated punishment [or the risk] 
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can be quite severe.” For rebel leaders, we would expect an even more severe punishment in case 
of removal. In this sense, as Lai and Slater (2006) assert, less secure (nonconsolidated) military 
regimes should be more likely to be bellicose as a way to legitimate their rule and divert 
attention from potential in-group problems. Rebel leaders, as the organizers of rebellion, have to 
face the kind of challenges that require authority implementation to overcome. The challenge of 
control over rebel forces particularly appears when a rebel leader’s task turns from attracting 
recruits to controlling their behavior (Wood, 2010; Weinstein, 2007).  
Considering the violence-prone nature of rebel groups, it is safe to say that maintaining 
solid authority over rebel forces can be a difficult task. Rebel leaders ‘face tremendous obstacles 
in launching and sustaining insurgencies’ (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007). One factor that makes 
this task even more difficult is that rebels suffer from collective action problems. A rebellion’s 
success depends largely on the leader’s ability to overcome these problems and to manage 
recruits consistent with the objectives of the rebellion (Petersen, 2001; Wood, 2003; Mursheb 
and Gates, 2005; Collier, 2001). Rebel groups posed with an authority vacuum face collective 
action complications, such as inequality between group members (Olson, 1965), which gives 
rebel leaders an incentive to target civilians since they mostly lack the organizational disposition 
(Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007) and/or resources (Wood, 2010) to provide sufficient benefits to their 
followers in order to entice their loyalty. Therefore, rebel leaders can choose to offer selective 
incentives which are powerful enough to overcome the cost of participation.32 Most rebels seek 
benefits that are both rival and excludable, such as “loot.” By providing the opportunity of 
killing civilians to their subjects in their early tenure, rebel leaders can alleviate if not eliminate 
the collective action problems they face.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  The extant literature on selective incentives within the collective action approach provides fairly robust evidence 
that rebels often receive private material incentives for participation above and beyond any anticipated public goods 
(Lichbach, 1995; Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007).  
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Moreover, establishing leadership authority requires a considerable amount of time. Thus, 
new leaders, I argue, are more likely to make aggressive decisions to intensify their authority and 
dominance on their own subjects, and to demonstrate their strength to governments as well. In 
other words, a short-tenured leader’s decision to target civilians serves as a signal to both rebel 
forces and the government. Many rebel groups use this threat as a bargaining card against the 
government to extort concessions or strengthen their hand in the negotiation table (Wood and 
Kathman, 2014).  
 In autocratic organizations like rebel groups, the authority largely stems from fear 
(Lewin, Lippitt, and White, 1939). In this sense, the rebels consider civilian killings as a signal 
of authority, because commanding to kill civilians in the early tenure demonstrates to the rebel 
forces that the leader is risk-acceptant within reason and strategic at the same time.  
The government perceives civilian deaths as a signal as well, because the leader hereby 
declares that the government will have to face some audience costs before all else. The 
government in power consequently has to bear some other serious political costs if it allows a 
rebel group to target the population it is expected to protect, especially when the government’s 
core constituency is targeted. As Hultman (2009) put it, rebels can employ violence as a conflict 
strategy to demonstrate ‘the power to hurt’. In this sense, violence – as a strategy of killing and 
destruction, can be considered as an instrument for rebel leaders to demonstrate the power to hurt 
and solidify their leadership both in-group and against governments. Therefore it carries 
importance for fledgling leaders to signal both the gravity of the rebellion and their dauntlessness 
as the commander.  
Longer-tenured leaders, by contrast, are more likely to put more emphasis on battle-
related tactics, which makes them more selective in resorting to violence against civilians, and 
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reduces the likelihood of their blind, imprudent, and mass killing actions.33 Since they are less 
likely to be constrained by in-group authority concerns, killing civilians becomes an act to 
reckon with only when it is exceedingly necessary. Moreover, experience comes to a rebel leader 
in parallel with not only an established authority but also a wider range of strategic options. 
Rebel leaders, who overcome recruitment and collective action problems as their tenure grows, 
are able to capture the advantage of focusing on strategic moves to attain the rebellion’s primary 
objectives. Given that the internal organizational problems are resolved due to the intensification 
of leadership authority over time, rebel leaders are now more able to develop result-driven 
strategies focusing largely on war outcomes, such as taking possession of resources, enhancing 
endowments, and winning battle victories (Weinstein, 2007).  
Also, Kalyvas (2000) contends that how rebel violence is used is a function of the degree 
of rebel control since violence should be considered as a strategic enterprise used by both parties 
to elicit collaboration. Such control becomes necessary for rebel leaders to solicit information 
about the behavior of civilians. As rebel leaders, and also their groups, exercise some control and 
gain more local information, they are likely to shift away from such a strategy over time.  
Some other scholars of conflict, on the other hand, view violence as a non-strategic by-
product of conflict due to looting, either because of indiscipline and lack of commitment by the 
fighters or as a means of financing the war. In an in-group context, they argue that rebel 
movements, to which rebels are recruited either by force or through pecuniary rewards, create a 
less cohesive rebel organization, and that higher magnitude of rebel violence could be interpreted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  The nuanced theory of Kalyvas (2006) breaks civil war violence down into two main categories. Selective 
violence refers to aggression directed towards individuals who are purposely and specifically targeted based on 
specific information about their actions. Indiscriminate violence, on the other hand, is executed en masse without 
regard for the actions or preferences of individuals. In this chapter, I simply assume that selective violence and 
fewer civilian deaths—and indiscriminate violence and more civilian deaths, can be considered as essentially 
equivalent with regard to the relative association in the meanings of the words (“specifically” vs. “en masse” = 
“fewer” vs. “more”.)  
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as a consequence of indiscipline among the rank and file (Weinstein, 2007). Even from this in-
group perspective, I argue that fledgling rebel leaders are more likely to face discipline-
implementation issues than experienced ones.  
Acknowledging the important insights gained from these explanations, I argue that 
longer-tenured rebel leaders are more likely to abstain from making decisions to victimize 
civilian populations. Civilians are strategic actors who are capable of offering or withholding 
their support and cooperation to the rebellion. In this sense, strategic leadership, in the absence of 
any authority concern, requires attempting to acquire the support of civilian population rather 
than victimizing them. The leader has a war to win and a rival to fight, thus, strategic choice for 
rebel leaders becomes much more crucial as their control over their forces solidifies.  
As many studies demonstrate, killing civilians indiscriminately should diminish over time 
as actors consider its counterproductive effects (Kalyvas 2004; Wood 2010). Given that 
victimizing civilians is not an end in itself as a political goal per se, but it can be an effective 
means of solidifying control and authority, to show strength, and, finally, to win a war, its usage 
should have diminishing returns. Rebel leaders have to face a risk of counterproductive effects 
emerging when the tolerable level of violence against civilians is crossed. Therefore, rebel 
leaders must be careful in keeping their strategy somewhere between killing civilians to intensify 
their leadership and losing the justifiability of the rebellion. On this account, longer tenure 
leaders should be more capable of managing this strategic balance of victimization than the less 
experienced ones. Recent scholastic research on civilian victimization in civil war asserts that 
although such killings may be indiscriminate in a conflict’s early stages, violence becomes more 
selective and infrequent over time for the following interrelated reasons: belligerents obtain 
better information on collaborators and defectors over time (Kasfir, 2005); indiscriminate 
	   68	  
violence is at least ineffective and often counterproductive as it generates anger against the 
perpetrator and spurs people to join the rebels (Herreros, 2006; Kalyvas, 2004); and, finally, 
belligerents eventually learn about these effects and switch to more selective violence (Downes, 
2006).  
To sum up, I suggest that rebel leaders’ ability to affect the level of violence against 
civilians derives in part from their tenure in power. Rebel leaders are considered as those who 
stand at the top of the decision-mechanism for killing civilians, and determines and modifies the 
future strategy of the rebellion. The insight of the theory can be restated as below: 
 
 
Hypothesis: The longer the rebel leader’s tenure, the lesser the level of rebel violence against 
civilians in civil war. 
 
One would argue that my argument touches, at least slightly, on rebel leader survival 
since a part of it (authority implementation) can vary together with leaders’ survival incentives. I, 
however, do not contend by any means that rebel leaders resort to violence against civilians only 
when they feel insecure in power. Note that my objective in this Chapter is not to formulate a 
general theory of civilian victimization. Rebel violence against civilians is a function of many 
factors. My argument specifically concerns the time period in which rebel leaders, and their 
leadership, have to face introductory challenges. Even though the underlying assumptions 
supporting the theoretical framework seem to go hand in hand with the survival-driven 
incentives, I primarily aim to demonstrate that rebel leadership has its own processes, and that 
civilians are more likely to be on target in rebel leaders’ early tenure. Nevertheless, I address this 
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potential concern in the empirical design by testing a specification accounting for both tenure 
and predicted survival of rebel leaders.    
 
Research Design 
The hypothesis is tested on a dataset structured with conflict episode-month for all 
African civil wars from 1991 to 2008 as the unit of analysis.34 The dataset is largely based on the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed 
Conflict Data v.4-2009, minor and major armed conflicts. I collected the data for the key 
independent variable of rebel leader tenure from multiple resources, such as the UCDP database 
and the UNCTAD reports. The years in which armed conflicts are inactive are included in the 
data for two years following a drop of battle-related violence below the 25 deaths/year threshold. 
The monthly observations allow to analyze the effects of short-term changes in rebel leadership. 
A rebel group has to be active some time during the period of observation to be included in the 
dataset, in accordance with the UCDP definition of armed conflict: an incompatibility (over 
either governmental power or territory, or both) between a government and one or more rebel 
groups that in one year result in at least 25 battle-related deaths. In contrary to the threshold for 
inclusion in many other civil war studies that require 1,000 battle deaths a year, the one in this 
dataset allows for a study of civilian victimization also during low intensity conflicts (Hultman 
2007, 211). The dataset covers 95 rebel groups and 26 countries in total (see the included 
Appendix for list of rebel groups).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  If dated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 46% of the world’s civil wars were African at the end of the 
Cold War. If dated by the fall of the USSR in 1991, 53% of the world’s civil wars were African (Bates, Coatsworth, 
and Williamson, 2009).  
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The hypothesis accounts for the magnitude of violence against civilians. The dependent 
variable, civilians killed by rebels, is therefore a count of the number of civilians intentionally 
killed by the rebels each month. The data are collected as events data, covering information on 
each event where civilians were deliberately targeted, subsequently aggregated to monthly 
observations. Where an event that produces civilian deaths by rebels, for instance, spans two or 
more months, all deaths are assigned to the first month. It should be noted that only killings 
resulted from one-sided rebel violence are coded, which means that civilians killed in the 
crossfire are excluded from this variable. Moreover, killings of civilians where the perpetrator is 
unknown or indirect killings, such as starvation of conflict areas, are thereby also excluded (Eck 
and Hultman, 2007).  The key independent variable, rebel leader tenure, captures the average 
number of months that rebel leaders have been in power, coded based on data from the UCDP 
and the UNCTAD. The tenure of the most rebel leaders starts before the armed conflict begins, 
so the variable is coded accordingly to be able to capture the pre-war period of leadership. The 
data contain a considerable number of conflicts with multiple rebel groups fighting the 
government simultaneously. Since the values for civilians killed by rebels are the sum of 
violence by all rebel groups in the conflict, the original data do not allow us to know which rebel 
group killed how many civilians in a conflict month. Therefore, an average tenure variable is 
generated, measured as the average of all rebel leaders’ tenure in that conflict month. In the 
Model 3 and 4, however, only the conflicts with one rebel group are included as the key 
independent variable.  
A set of control variables is included. The first control is a dummy for type of 
incompatibility over which the rebels challenge the government, coded as territorial conflict = 1, 
and governmental conflict = 2. Civil conflicts are commonly distinguished between 
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governmental and territorial conflicts. Governmental conflicts occur over the type of political 
regime, the replacement of the central authority, or the change of its composition. Territorial 
conflicts, on the other hand, are about the status of a specified territory, often regarding demands 
for autonomy or secession (UCDP). Since governmental conflicts are more prone to bloodshed, 
we would expect more civilian casualties in those conflicts. 
I control for conflict duration since we would expect more civilian killings in longer 
conflicts. This is measured as number of months since the conflict started, based on the UCDP 
date for the first conflict episode. Conflict active is a dummy for whether the conflict is active 
(e.g. reaches the 25 battle deaths threshold) for that year or not; active=1, inactive=0, with the 
expectation that active-in-battlefield conflicts causes fewer civilian deaths since civilian 
victimization is generally employed as an alternative strategy by both sides.  
Another control variable is number of rebel groups fighting against government, ranges 
from 1 to 5 in the dataset. This variable is included only in the Model 2, since only civil conflicts 
with one rebel group are analyzed in the Model 3 and 4. Only 22.2% of the conflicts in the 
dataset have multiple rebel groups, and the N decreased from 3923 (Model 2) to 3023 (Model 
3&4).  
To enable an evaluation of the correlation between the intensity level of each party and 
violence against civilians, I add the one-month-lagged controls, battle deaths by governmentt-1 
and battle deaths by rebelst-1, measured as the number of battle-related deaths sustained by the 
sides in a  given month. The variables are lagged one month considering the short units of 
analysis and the likelihood that belligerents continue an already ongoing behavior (Eck and 
Hultman, 2007).  
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Not only civil conflicts but also conflict behavior may have a contagion effect (Hegre et 
al., 2013). A dummy variable (0/1) accounting for conflict in neighbor states is included and 
coded relying on the UCDP database.  And, finally, the last control is cumulative intensity, an 
indicator coming from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data, which takes on a value of 1 if the 
conflict ever exceeded 1,000 battle-related deaths since the onset, and 0 otherwise. The variable 
of predicted survival consists of values that are extracted from the fully specified survival model 
in Chapter 2. To address the potential issue that rebel leaders’ choice of targeting civilians can be 
driven by their survival-related concerns, I include predicted survival function of leaders for each 
conflict month. All variables are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of variables  
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
 
Number of civilians killed by rebels 
 
21.4161 
 
311.6599 
 
0 
 
14665 
 
Rebel leader tenure 
 
89.7177 
 
96.2822 
 
1 
 
428 
 
Predicted survival 
 
.8018 
 
.1529 
 
.2470 
 
.9961 
 
Incompatibility 
 
1.6828 
 
.4655 
 
1 
 
2 
 
Conflict_active 
 
.6616 
 
.4732 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Conflict duration 
 
48.9894 
 
46.4470 
 
1 
 
216 
 
Number of rebel groups 
 
1.3112 
 
.6618 
 
1 
 
5 
 
Conflict in neighborhood 
 
.8795 
 
.3256 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Battle deaths by government 
 
10.8887 
 
104.6097 
 
0 
 
3300 
 
Battle deaths by rebels 
 
9.1636 
 
44.4156 
 
0 
 
1032 
 
Cumulative intensity 
 
.6133 
 
.4871 
 
0 
 
1 
   
 
	   73	  
A count model is employed since the dependent variable is a count of civilians killed by 
rebels. The data are not normally distributed and largely consist of a large share of zero counts. 
The variance is greater than 1, and this over-dispersion indicates that the dependent variable has 
either unobserved heterogeneity or contagion, which requires the zero-inflated negative binomial 
model (ZINB) to overcome this (King 1989, 129). The ZINB estimates the model in two steps. 
Firstly, the ZINB produces a logit inflation model estimating the likelihood that an observation 
belongs to a population with a probability of 1 of having a zero count, thereby separating 
between cases at risk and those not at risk. 
This means that some rebel groups at the observed time simply have a zero probability of 
killing civilians, while there might be groups at risk of killing civilians that also produce a zero 
count (Zorn 1998, 375; Hultman 2007, 213). Secondly, the ZINB estimates the negative 
binomial function by capturing the magnitude of violence against civilians. By estimating the 
two dimensions simultaneously, it allows to analyze the extent to which an actor employs a 
strategy of targeting civilians, while at the same time adjusting for the excess zeros. Since these 
two models are part of the same estimation, they are reported in the same table (Hultman 2007, 
215). The empirical emphasis in the analysis, however, is on the second stage. I have also 
included a Vuong option to the estimation, which provides a test of whether the zero-inflated 
model or the standard negative binomial model is statistically favored.  
 
Data Analysis 
In order to demonstrate descriptive evidence, we can browse the correlation between the 
magnitude of rebel violence and rebel leader tenure, which is predicted by the hypothesis, 
through a scatterplot of civilian deaths by rebels and rebel leader tenure. As Figure 1 indicates, 
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the incidents with more civilian deaths are largely scattered on the early tenure of rebel leaders, 
which supports the hypothesis. We, however, need to apply to a better-determined empirical 
specification to test whether this correlation between rebel leader tenure and rebel violence 
against civilians reveals causation. 
 
 
Figure 1. Scatterplot of rebel leader tenure and civilians killed by rebels 
 
 
 
 
All statistical results are reported in Table 2. Those presented in the left part of the table 
are coefficients from the negative binomial regression, adjusted for zero-inflation, on the number 
of civilians killed by rebels. These are the results that underlie the testing of the hypothesis. The 
right hand side of the table represents the coefficients from the logit inflation model. These 
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coefficients, however, are not the basis for analysis here. Before testing the fully specified model 
with all control variables, the correlation between civilians killed by rebels and the key 
independent variable, rebel leader tenure, is tested to evaluate the hypothesis as such before 
testing the robustness of the results. Model 1 in Table 2 presents the results indicating that there 
is a significant and negative correlation between rebel leader tenure and number of civilians 
killed by rebels just as predicted. This statistically significant, though preliminary, result 
supports the argument that shorter-tenured rebel leaders are more likely to target civilians. 
The fully specified model including all the control variables is presented in Model 2. The 
ZINB enables substantial estimations of the effects, analyzing the expected percent change in the 
dependent variables when an independent variable changes one unit—holding all other variables 
constant (Long and Freese, 2003; Hultman, 2007). The effect of rebel leader tenure on civilian 
killings remains negative and statistically significant at the level of p < .1, which implies that the 
hypothesis is supported by the statistical results.  
Each additional month a rebel leader remains in power decreases the number of civilians 
killed by rebels by 0.4%, holding all other variables constant. Another way of evaluating the 
magnitude of the effect of this change is by looking at the percent change when the independent 
variable increases with one standard deviation. For rebel leader tenure, an increase with one 
standard deviation means another 93 months in office, and then the expected change is 31% 
fewer civilians killed by rebels. Therefore, the substantive effect in the Model 1 can be 
considered fairly robust given that the set of control variables that capture other aspects of the 
victimization, which could have possibly hurt the correlation between rebel leader tenure and 
civilian killings, are included in the fully-specified Model 2.  
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Among the control variables, conflict active, battle deaths by governmentt-1, number of 
rebel groups, conflict in neighborhood, and cumulative intensity are statistically significant. 
According to results, the number of civilians killed by rebels is associated with fewer rebel 
groups fighting against government simultaneously, existence of a conflict in neighbor states, 
higher number of battle deaths by government, and, finally, conflicts which ever exceeded 1,000 
battle-related deaths since the onset.  
As mentioned above, due to the data restrictions, the key independent variable is 
measured as the average tenure of rebel leaders where there are multiple rebel groups fighting 
against government simultaneously. One would argue that this way of measurement could 
diminish the variable’s capacity of capturing the potential effect since averaging the tenure 
sweeps away the differences between rebel leaders’ tenure and the potential individual effects 
that stem from it. Therefore, in Model 3, the sample is reduced to the conflicts with only one 
rebel group fighting against government. The variables in the Model 2 are also included in the 
Model 3, except number of rebel groups. The effect of rebel leader tenure still remains negative 
and statistically significant at the level of p < .01, which indicates that the results produced by 
first two models are robust and support the hypothesis. Each additional month a rebel leader 
remains in power decreases the number of civilians killed by rebels by 1%, holding all other 
variables constant. As an alternative interpretation of the magnitude of the effect, an increase of 
one standard deviation in rebel leader tenure (101 months in office) makes us expect 65% fewer 
civilians killed by rebels.  
Differently form the Model 2, having a conflict in neighborhood and fighting a civil 
conflict which ever exceeded 1,000 battle-related deaths since the onset show no significant 
effect on the civilian killings by rebels in the Model 3. Number of battle deaths by government, 
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on the other hand, remains statistically significant and positively associated with the outcome 
variable.  
Model 4 includes predicted survival of rebel leaders. As the findings indicate, tenure is 
still negatively correlated with civilian killings, and this result is statistically significant at the 
level of p < .01. Predicted survival likelihood of rebel leaders also shows statistical significance 
at the level of p < .05. Given that the variable is positively correlated with the number of civilian 
killings, we can contend that rebel leaders tend to target more civilians when they are least likely 
to lose power, which occurs early in their tenure. This finding addresses the potential alternative 
argument that rebel leaders choose to kill civilians to survive in power by showing that this is not 
the case. Rebel leaders’ tendency of victimizing civilians in their early tenure persists even when 
controlled for their likelihood of survival. 
As an evaluation of the statistical findings, overall, the suggested link between rebel 
leader tenure and rebel violence finds some empirical support. Even when controlling for some 
potential conflict-level and group-level indicators, rebel leaders are more likely to resort to 
violence against civilians in their early tenure. This finding is robust when the universe of rebel 
groups is cut down to include only those that fight against incumbents as the only rebel 
organization. This find is also in line with Kalyvas (2004) and Wood (2010) who suggest that 
indiscriminate violence should diminish over time as political actors recognize its 
counterproductive effects. 
Turning to the control variables that capture the conflict dynamics, we observe some 
interesting patterns. According to findings, the number of rebel groups fighting in the war is 
significantly and negatively associated with rebel violence. This is interesting considering the 
recent finding of Wood and Kathman (2015) that rebel groups are more likely to target civilians 
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upon the entrance of new rivals due to the perceived threat to control over resources and because 
the arrival of new groups diminishes the gains existing groups expect from either victory or 
successful conflict bargaining.  
Battle-related government killings have a positive, significant, but a relatively small 
effect on rebel killings of civilians in several models. This indicates that rebels choose to use 
more violence against civilians when the incumbents they are fighting are targeting the rebel 
population. One reason might be that the rebels try to revenge by targeting civilians to impose 
some serious audience costs on the government. This finding is also in line with Hultman (2007).  
Finally, according to findings, the intensity of the conflict is significantly and positively 
associated with rebel violence. Given that the intensity is related to the number of battle-related 
deaths, this finding suggests that the escalation in the level of violence between rebels and 
government is likely to spill over the civilian population.  
 
Conclusion 
The findings on the African civil wars suggest that examining the effects of micro-level 
leadership factors on civilian victimization is potentially fruitful for understanding why and 
when rebels tend to target civilians. Rebel leader tenure may play a role in the magnitude of 
violence against civilians in civil war. I argued, and tried to provide empirical evidence for, that 
shorter rebel leaders’ tenure, the more civilians we can expect their groups to kill intentionally.  
The main argument, in combination with the empirical findings in this chapter, reveals a 
new aspect regarding violence in civil war. In addition to the given importance of leadership, the 
empirical results also confirm the potential importance of analyzing civilian victimization at the 
individual-level. Therefore, individuals should not be considered as uninfluential or passive 
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actors of armed civil conflicts. They, on the contrary, should be taken into consideration as 
substantial actors that can play a key role in many aspects of conflicts, including targeting 
civilians, by organizing, fighting, manipulating, and most importantly, leading a rebellion. 
Despite the undeniable fact that decision making and actions taken during wartime are mainly 
shaped and determined by institutions and the conflict environment, individuals can still be the 
fundemental actors in civil wars.  
It should also be noted that the results presented here are not exempt from some 
limitations. The empirical models need a couple more specifications included to be able to 
reduce any concern that the results are driven by the group dynamics. Although the empirical 
strategy of this chapter includes a serious consideration of some conflict-related factors, I must 
admit that there is still room for concerns that the higher number of civilian killings in leaders’ 
early tenure can be driven by some group dynamics. Including various lags to the models on 
civilians killed and turnover rate would be helpful to strengthen these results and to demonstrate 
that this is leaders’ choice rather than group or stiuational dynamics.  
Also, a concern may be raised about the possibility of selection. Do rebel leaders tend to 
target civilians in their early tenure, or do they die young because they are violent? However, it 
would be safe to assume that rebel leaders would put themselves in much more deadly situations 
if they were choosing to fight on the battlefield. This sometimes happens as new leaders seek to 
make a name for themselves to gain respect by showing that they can win battles. However, 
although this chapter focuses on the choice to kill civilians, admittedly, there is still room for 
several alternative causal paths that can explain the phenomenon. 	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CHAPTER V. 
REBELS IN OFFICE: POST-CONFLICT LEADERSHIP 
TRANSITION AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT INITIATION 	  
Rebel leaders fight for political power and rebel victories. In some cases, negotiated 
settlements of civil wars bring political opportunities for the leaders. In most post-war contexts, 
as long as rebels are able to receive at the least some concessions, former rebel leaders continue 
to pursue political careers. The advancement of rebel leaders in the political field is, thus, being 
the political leader in the post-war society. Although rebel careers have a strong variance –some 
become senior politicians, while others have to be content with lower level positions– most 
winner rebel leaders aim to be the leader of the state.  
The integration of rebels is one of the substantial post-war challenges. Former rebels can 
serve in the political establishment of a post-war society as president, parliamentarian, minister 
or high government official without necessarily belonging to a political party that has risen from 
a rebel group. Civil wars shape not only post-war societies but also the political elites who 
operate in those societies. Post-conflict shifts in the political leadership are clearly connected to 
the upheavals generated by the conflict. Therefore, any theory about the post-war careers of rebel 
leaders should take into account the historical context–which is the civil war– in which the rebels 
come into play as counter-elites in control of armed organizations and often territories.  
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Civil wars initiate dynamics of social mobility, and, depending on their territorial and 
temporal extension, they tend to cause some substantial changes in a society and its elite 
structure, which is highly likely to affect post-war conditions as well. Rebel leaders are not 
exempt from this social dynamic. Where they manage to force the government to negotiated 
settlements or they are able to get even a military victory, the post-war order give them 
opportunities for longer political careers (Maleseivic, 2010). 
Laurent Desire Kabila was the president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
from 1997 to 2001. He had led a group of four Congolese rebel groups, the Alliance of 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), for years before he came to 
power by proclaiming himself as the president of the DRC. Kabila was just one of many state 
leaders who were once rebel leaders, and, as the historical record indicates, these leaders tend to 
struggle to keep their states out of militarized conflicts when they take off their guerrilla 
uniforms and sit on the chair of presidency.    
This chapter focuses on rebel leaders’ post-conflict behavior when they become state 
leaders by specifically emphasizing the potential role of prior rebel experience at the leadership 
level in interstate conflict initiation. The idea that former rebel experience may affect future 
leadership behavior relies on two different bodies of literature: Political-psychology-oriented 
research on the role of former experiences in political behavior including decision-making, and 
the emerging scholarly work on the causal mechanism between leaders’ backgrounds and 
conflict behavior. In this sense, the argument presented in this chapter also attempts to integrate 
the insights that have been provided by these two avenues of research by underlying the causal 
paths previously addressed by both.  
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Despite enormous growth in research on leaders over the last several years (Weeks, 2011; 
Debs, and Goemans, 2010; Croco, 2011; Flores et al., 2013), nearly all current research on 
leaders and interstate conflict focuses on how domestic institutional settings constrain and form 
behavior of leaders rather than demonstrating how variation in leaders’ individual attributes 
affects state behavior. The international relations literature on leaders focuses on how variations 
in domestic institutional contexts shape factors such as leadership tenure (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004), the institutionally-induced relationship between 
leadership tenure and conflict (Goemans, 2008; Debs and Goemans 2010), the responsibility and 
punishment of leaders (Goemans 2000; Croco, 2011; Wolford, 2012), and the decisions of 
leaders in the military arena (Weeks, 2011).  
The conventional wisdom that former experiences determine, or at least heavily affect, an 
individual’s future behavior constitutes a central assumption in many fields of social science 
including psychology and sociology. Even though many political scientists may heuristically 
embrace this insight, the current interstate conflict research fails to incorporate adequately how 
this causal mechanism may systematically work in explaining leaders’ conflict behavior.  
As Horowitz and Stam (2012) posit, early political psychology studies on elite behavior 
suggest that former life experiences –educational backgrounds, crises, major events– equip elites 
for their future leadership roles and help us to understand their leadership behavior once they are 
in office (Lasswell and Lerner, 1965; Putnam, 1976). Hermann (1980) contends that scholars of 
international politics tend to understate the individual-level dynamics of leadership and their role 
in foreign policy making.  
Despite then growing research on psychological foundations of leaders’ beliefs and 
preferences (Hermann, 1980, 2003; Greenstein, 1992; Barber, 1992; Post, 2003), this fruitful 
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bridge between politics and psychology has produced little systematic scholarly work evaluating 
the effects of former experiences in the way leaders behave in office except the more current 
studies of Horowitz and Stam (2012) and Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2013) striking this gap by 
employing leaders as the level of analysis.  
In her analysis of leadership style, Hermann (1980) accommodates four kinds of personal 
characteristics: beliefs and motives, which determine a leader’s view of the world; and decision 
style and interpersonal style, which shape a leader’s personal political behavior. Hermann’s 
“decision style” overlaps with the instrumental beliefs definition of George’s (1969) and some 
aspects of Barber’s (1992) formulation of presidential character (Strack, 2005). Although all 
these studies mention that former life experiences play a role in shaping the personal 
characteristics –both leaders’ world view and political behavior, however, the political 
psychology and international relations literatures have little systematic work sharply examining 
how formative experiences, such as military-related experiences, affect the leader behavior.   
On the other hand, we have at least a well-established psychology literature suggesting 
that interplay of genes and environment explain much of individuals’ behavior and attitudes 
(Horowitz and Stam, 2012). Individuals’ environment includes much of life experiences such as 
schooling, parenting, training etc. Psychologists, therefore, suggest that all these factors 
determine individuals’ preferences, risk attitudes, and personal dispositions (Roberts et al., 2003; 
Caspi and Roberts, 2005).  
Exposure to combat specifically represents a foundational and arguably traumatic 
experience that may affect future violence-related beliefs and behavior (Voors et al., 2010). 
Some micro-level data suggests that exposure to combat makes people more risk acceptant. 
Survey research by Brunk et al. (1990) focusing on retired military officers in the United States 
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found that those who had participated in combat were significantly less sensitive to risk. In 
Burundi, Voors et al., (2010) used variation in exposure to combat at the village level as a way to 
measure risk attitudes among villagers. They showed that people in villages exposed to combat 
have higher levels of risk seeking and discount the future more. 
In most cases, participation in rebellious activity is an extremely risk-acceptant choice. 
Rebel groups are constantly threatened by incumbents and are much more likely to be eliminated 
than to win the war. Rebel leaders’ risk propensity therefore will potentially translate into more 
revisionist behavior if the rebellion succeeds and they achieve their goal of taking control of the 
state. After all, revisionist behavior on an international scale is likely to involve the threat or use 
of military force.  
This argument is consistent with Colgan’s (2010), who finds that revolutionary regimes 
are more likely to engage in militarized behavior. Those with prior rebel experience might also 
be more risk acceptant in general, however, even if they do not immediately rise to power 
following a successful rebellion. He also suggests that the effects of revolutionary regimes might 
lie in part with the background characteristics of the leaders who control them. 
All political leaders are risk-tolerant and ambitious to some extent. However, as Colgan 
(2013b) asserts, the level of risk-tolerance of a leader is higher when he/she faces overwhelming 
challenges rather than a regularized process to reach the office, such as using violence against 
multiple rivals including government in many cases. In Colgan’s (2013a, p. 23) words, “George 
Bush took some risks to obtain office; Fidel Castro took considerably more.” 
Rebel leadership comes forth as one of the most relevant experiences for a state leader 
within this context.  Despite the fact that all rebel leaders are not necessarily “revolutionary”, in 
most cases they still have to be ruthless and risk-tolerant enough to attempt to overturn the 
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established political apparatus and power of government. In other words, rebel leadership is a 
particularly risky endeavor because challenging the state with military force is an action much 
more likely to end in failure than success, and those on the losing side often suffer severe 
personal consequences (Horowitz and Stam, 2012).  
Individuals who self-select into rebel leadership should thus be especially risk acceptant, 
a trait likely to carry over if and when they win office later in their lives. Therefore, one may 
argue that former rebel leaders, like revolutionary leaders, are considerably more risk-tolerant 
than their counterparts who win the office through a regularized process simply because 
rebellions select risk-tolerant and ambitious leaders.  
Even only participation in a rebel group might be considered as a type of experience that 
predicts more risk-acceptant behavior once a leader wins office. Given that simply participating 
in rebel forces signals that an individual is likely to be more risk-acceptant than usual (Stanton, 
2009), success as a rebel likely reinforces this innate proclivity (Corr, 2004). The causal link 
between rebel experience and future military behavior follows logically from thinking about the 
people who are most likely to join rebellion. Their grievances with the existing nation-state 
apparatus (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Collier, 2001; Berdal and Malone, 2000; Sambanis, 2002) 
are so large that they choose the optimal strategy of getting armed and seeking to secede or even 
conquer the state.  
Some studies introduce argumental support for this causal mechanism. Huntington (1957) 
reveals that “...the armed man is held to believe that peace is stultifying and that conflict and war 
develop man’s highest moral and intellectual qualities; he favors aggressive and bellicose 
national policies”. Skocpol (1979, 1988) asserts that revolutionary leaders are driven in their 
foreign policy decisions by desire to compensate past military failures. Sechser (2004) posits that 
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ties to the military groups also create parochial interests in favor of using armed force and 
decision-making biases towards rapid escalation. George (1980) contends that the prior 
experiences of leaders inform their sense of personal efficacy. Matthews (1954) suggests that 
prior experiences affect the way leaders view the potential costs and benefit of decisions, and the 
types of strategies they consider as likely to succeed.   
Another body of literature that explicitly applies to this context deals with elite opinions 
and foreign policy of the United States, and examines preferences regarding the use of force  
(Wittkopf, 1990; Peffley et al., 1995; Holsti, 1996). At this point, the substantial division among 
elites who may have a word on the use of force is the distinction between civilian and military 
leadership. There have been two schools of thought regarding civilian and military opinions and 
the use of force (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004). As a matter of fact, these two schools directly relate to 
the two competing hypotheses in this chapter.  
The traditional view contends that militaries are inclined to militarism, which can make 
them to embrace the martial way of life and to develop an excessive faith in military resolutions 
to political problems. This tendency makes them war-prone and therefore a threat to the polity 
they are supposed to provide security (Ekirch, 1956). More specifically, military experience may 
lead leaders to employ rather expansive foreign policy goals (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004). 35 
There is also some evidence for countries other than the United States that militaries are 
more war-prone. Brecher (1996) points out that militaries in power are likely to resort to violence 
or more severe violence, even if alternative solutions of crisis are available. Lasswell (1997) 
describes militaries as “specialists on violence”. Relying on his cross-national empirical analysis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 American history is full with concerns over the expansion of militarism among military elites. The belief that 
strong military influence over the government would make it more war-prone drove the Constitution framers’ 
decision to make civilian control of the military so essential a feature of the Constitution (Kohn, 1975; Feaver and 
Gelpi, 2004). 
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of comparative foreign policy between 1959-68, Geller (1985) finds that nations in which 
militaries have substantial influence on the policy-making mechanism employ foreign behaviors 
that are more bellicose and less cooperative than nations in which militaries lack this influence. 
Barnett (1970) argues that the power of the German Army was a crucial factor causing World 
War I. Also, in Japan, the weak civilian elites against the strong military frequently facilitated 
international conflicts (Rousseau, 1996). It is likely that, whenever military influence increases 
within two states in a conflict, the probability for a tendency toward escalation increases. To put 
it differently, all other factors being equal, as military influence increases, military measures are 
expected to come into play (Choi and James, 2005).  
The historical record, especially in Africa, shows that many rebel leaders became 
presidents after they had fought a civil war. We observe this pattern, for instance, in CAR, 
Burundi, Rwanda, and DRC. Note that mentioning former rebel leaders who won office 
afterwards actually refers to a success since a failure in civil war as a rebel leader is highly likely 
to close the road to office. In this sense, self-selection into state leadership may differ from self-
selection into rebel leadership. The organizational form of rebel groups varies tremendously and 
ranges from loosely organized groups to quasi-states (Bakonyi et al. 2006). However, leaders are 
often well educated and have been politically active before the war, not least as members of the 
political establishment. Socio-economic disparities between leaders and the recruits are usually 
quite large (Malthaner, 2007). Rebel leaders have economic, social, cultural, or symbolic 
(collective recognition of the first three) capital, which help them to gain and obtain their status 
throughout the war (Bourdieu, 1998). When it comes to self-selection into governmental 
leadership, though, they heavily rely on their long established leadership and success that they 
have opportunity to translate from rebel organization to state structure.  
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Although some of them experience exile or imprisonment, even staying alive and getting 
in charge of the country can easily be considered as a success. Thus, we should expect that those 
who experienced success during their rebel careers should be more prone to think of the use of 
military force in a positive light when they become state leaders, making them more conflict 
prone (Colgan, 2013a; Horowitz and Stam, 2012; Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2013). Additionally, 
risk-tolerance is highly relevant for interstate conflicts since MIDs are much less predictable than 
accepting the status quo (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, 2004; Filson and 
Warner, 2004), and ambitious leaders who did not accept the status quo domestically are more 
likely to reject the status quo internationally once they are in office.  
Skocpol (1988) contends that successful revolutionary leaders are particularly good at 
organizing and mobilizing their subjects for campaigns of mass violence. This appears as a skill 
that is beneficial for them to be successful in the domestic revolutionary struggle. Harff and Gurr 
(1988) support this view, but they argue that revolutionary leaders who have secured power and 
maintained their leadership by resorting to violence domestically are disposed to respond 
violently to future challenges, even if those challenges arise internationally. 
The other causal path between former rebel leaders and conflict initiation relies on the 
internal factors. While putting emphasis on leaders’ preferences, I should not overlook the 
structural –and hence institutional differences between rebel groups and states. State leaders 
operate within the constraints of a political system, rarely having the capacity to rule by fiat. 
Even authoritarian leaders have to deal with institutional checks and balances, despite typically 
weaker ones than those in democratic systems, that make it difficult to enact policies exactly 
when and how they wish (Cheibub et al., 2010).  
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Rebel leaders, however, are less likely to face these constraints of domestic political 
structures, at least in short-term, once they are in office since they mostly carry on their authority 
and charisma stemmed from their rebel leadership. This “rebellion winner” effect lasts at least 
until the post-war order is consolidated and the domestic political structure gets normalized 
(Hensell and Gerdes, 2013).  
As part of the post-civil war period, especially in revolutionary civil wars, the domestic 
structure is either overturned or significantly changed or replaced by a new structure (Huntington, 
1968; Skocpol 1979; Walt, 1996). This amplifies the salience of the leaders’ preferences and 
risk-tolerance, which are largely determined by their prior experiences (Colgan, 2013). 
Furthermore, the lack of well-established domestic constraints also increases the likelihood of 
strategic miscalculations since nobody outside of the leaders’ inner circle is allowed to provide 
objective input on decisions (Walt, 1996). Taking all these into consideration, then, we can 
expect the following hypothesis: 
 
H1a: Leaders with prior rebel leadership experience should be more likely to initiate interstate 
conflicts. 
 
 
Some scholars, on the other hand, provide contradictory arguments based on the 
alternative perspective that prior military-related experience actually leads to less conflict-prone 
leaders in office. As mentioned above, there have been two schools of thought regarding civilian 
and military preferences and the use of force. The first approach, called the traditional view, 
treats leaders with military background as conflictual individuals who are likely to employ 
violence to solve political problems. In spite of this widely accepted perspective, a second school 
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of thought argues that militarism is not quite a central concern, at least not within the American 
military elite. The consensus in the body of literature on Cold War and post-Cold War civil-
military relations in the United States is that civilian leaders tend to have more far-reaching 
foreign policy goals and greater faith in military solutions to political problems (Huntington, 
1957; Janowitz, 1960; Petraeus, 1989; Betts, 1991).  
The assertions of this school of thought have been pervasive since Huntington’s classic 
treatise The Soldier and the State (1957). Huntington argues that leaders with military experience 
are risk-averse in the actual use of force, even though they tend to view the world through a 
threatening lens, because they evaluate other states based on their capabilities rather than their 
intentions. He claims that the conservative military advocates preparedness but rarely favors war 
since militaries only favors war when a military victory is a near certainty.36   
Janowitz (1960) argues that military leaders are often more realistic and conservative 
about the use of force than their non-military counterparts, although this fact is mostly 
disregarded by the flawed perception of militaries as conflict seekers (Horowitz and Stam, 2012).  
Betts (1991) affirms Huntington’s claims concluding from several detailed case analyses 
that U.S. militaries were typically more diffident than their civilian counterparts about suggesting 
military action.37 There is also evidence on countries other than the U.S. supporting this view. 
Scholars following in Betts’s footsteps have drawn similar conclusions from studies of Great 
Britain, India, African military dictatorships, and the United States since the Vietnam War (Lee 
1991; Andreski 1980; Bienen 1980; Sagan, 1986; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Feaver and Gelpi contend that Huntington is not consistent on this point, and that he draws the opposite picture 
when he contrasts two perspectives of peace and war. For the detailed demonstration of Huntington’s inconsistency, 
see. Feaver and Gelpi, 2004, p. 24-25.  
37 Betts (1991) argues, however, that militaries tend to favor tactical escalation, which is, once war has begun, 
militaries tend to recommend large-scale, decisive operations.  	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This view also bases its logic on the assumption that since militaries pay for wars with 
their own blood, they tend to be reluctant to order troops into combat. Civilian politicians, in 
contrast, without any experience of the horror of combat, are more likely to engage in military 
actions. This logic appeared repeatedly on the eve of the 2003 American offensive in Iraq, with 
opponents of the invasion asserting that the excessive enthusiasm of some civilian elites for a 
military campaign exposed a lack of firsthand experience in combat. Senator Chuck Hagel 
emblematically remarked on this viewpoint:  
 
Many of those who want to rush this country into war and think it would be so quick and easy 
don’t know anything about war. They come at it from an intellectual perspective, versus having 
sat in jungles or foxholes and watched their friends get their heads blown off (Quoted in Sechser, 
2004).  
 
Also, some analyses of U.S. decision-making during the cold war crises highlight a 
general civil-military pattern of disagreement (Gelpi and Feaver, 2002). It has been argued that 
civilian leaders tend to be more willing to use the military force to deal with a diplomatic 
problem, while military leaders tend toward greater reluctance in employing a military solution 
to such problems (Gacek, 1994; Feaver, 1995). Leaders and political elites with military 
experience represent a “realpolitik” view that reserves the use of force for interstate crises that 
include a substantial threat to national security or allies, control of territory, and the maintenance 
of geostrategic access and position. Leaders with no military experience, on the other hand, tend 
to hold a view called “interventionist” which extends the use military force to address some other 
issues that do not exactly fit within the interstate security paradigm. Such diplomatic problems 
include human rights abuses, the internal collapse of governance, and the attempt to alter a 
state’s domestic regime (Feaver and Gelpi, 1999). Thus, civilian leaders will generally have a 
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wider set of problems across which they choose to resort to the use of force, while leaders with 
military experience will employ force only over a narrower range of issues.38 These lead to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1b: Leaders with prior rebel leadership experience should be less likely to initiate interstate 
conflicts. 
 
 
Empirical Strategy and Data Analysis 
The main portion of the data comes from multiple datasets: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset v.4-2012; Correlates of War (COW) Data v4.0; Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009) 
to obtain the universe of heads of state; finally, the data on prior rebel leadership experience are 
gathered from several sources such as databases of prominent leaders, leader-specific 
encyclopedias, individual biographies, and the UNCTAD reports. The final data consist of 9,451 
leader years covering 1084 separate leaders from 1946 to 2001. The unit of analysis is the leader-
year. In other words, there is one observation per leader, per year.  
Prior rebel experience might affect the way leaders make decisions once they get into 
office in several ways. For the purposes of this chapter, though, I focus on the initiation of 
interstate armed conflicts. Thus, the dependent variable of interest is the initiation of interstate 
armed conflicts. Initiation is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a state initiated a conflict in a 
given leader-year and 0 otherwise. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 In the post-cold war era, the civilian-military distinction has grown more noticeable, and has fed the concern 
about the reluctant ex-warriors who are strictly resisting civilian-led demands to use force abroad (Kohn, 1994; 
Feaver, 1998; Desch, 1999; Rizer, 2000).  	  
	   94	  
The first key independent variable is also a dummy (0/1) for prior rebel leadership 
experience. The theory I rely on mostly refers to rebel leadership. Prior participation to rebellious 
movements, however, may also have similar effects on state leaders’ foreign policy behavior. 
The argument of risk-acceptance and the civilian-military distinction can both tell us about the 
potential influence of not only rebel leadership but also prior participation to insurgencies. 
Indeed, the historical record indicates that some state leaders were once rebel elites, not 
necessarily rebel leaders (e.g. Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, Salvador Sanchez Caren in El Salvador, 
Taur Matan Ruak in East Timor). I add a dichotomous variable for prior participation to 
rebellious movements to capture this potential mechanism. 
Broken down by decade and rebel experience, Figure 1 demonstrates the variation over 
time in the rebellious backgrounds of heads of state from 1900-2004.39 The results indicate that 
most leaders do not have rebel experience. There is variation over time, though the percentage of 
leaders with prior rebel experience, with the exception of the incomplete last decade, tends to 
vary between 20 and 30 percent. The increase in the percentage of leaders with rebel experience 
in the 1940s and 1950s is mainly due to the European leaders who served in resistance 
movements in World War II, and leaders of newly decolonized countries, especially in Africa. 
Some studies contend that leaders with military background may be driven in their 
foreign policy goals by a desire to atone for past military failures (Skocpol 1979, 1988). A 
variable is also added to see how rebel leaders did in those conflicts to be able to consider that 
experience of winning or losing may drive the results. Prior rebel win/loss is coded 1 if the 
relevant condition is met and 0 otherwise. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Data come from Lentz (1994, 1999), encyclopedia of heads of states and governments, individual leader 
biographies, and other sources.	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Figure 1. Prior Rebel Leadership and Rebellion Participation of State Heads 
 
 
 
The hypotheses are tested through logit models. While the results are consistent without 
control variables, to maintain the robustness some potentially confounding variables are added. 
Therefore, consistent with the existing international relations theories, I include a set of control 
variables. The material power of the state is included by incorporating the COW material 
capabilities score for each state with the expectation that states with greater capabilities are more 
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likely to initiate an armed conflict (Singer, 1987). The overall dyadic satisfaction of a state with 
the system leader may also influence that state’s likelihood of conflict initiation (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2003).  
Leaders act within an institutional environment, and they are restricted in their decisions 
and policies by the institutional checks and norms. Military experience may endow leaders in 
democratic states with more credibility in institutional competition against other bureaucratic 
actors (Horowitz and Stam, 2012). Autocratic leaders in general may have more freedom of 
action. Therefore, I control for the effect that different institutions may have on the probability 
that leaders engage in militarized behavior with an autocracy variable that is 0 if a state scored at 
or below -7 on the Polity scale, and 1 otherwise. Like military experience, age of leaders may 
give them more credibility in institutional structures (Horowitz et al., 2005). While some 
scholars find that aging leaders are more likely to be involved in armed conflicts than young 
leaders (Horowitz et al. 2005, Bak and Palmer, 2010), others assert that the leader’s age 
decreases the likelihood of conflict in dictatorships, but not in democratic regimes (Berton and 
Panel, 2014).  
One would argue that the same national-level factors that lead individuals to have rebel 
experiences also make countries more likely to engage in militarized behavior, meaning any 
results are endogenous. While possible, the time gaps between when individuals begin rebellious 
action and when they become heads of states are generally long and the international security 
environment often changes rapidly. To account for the possibility of selection that countries 
choose dispute-prone former rebel personnel as leaders when they expect to face a conflict in the 
near future, I include two control variables (Jones and Olken, 2005; Horowitz and Stam, 2012). 
The models 2 and 3 include two variables designed to control for the way leader selection based 
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on prior rebel experience could affect the probability of a militarized dispute. Time in Office 
measures the number of days a leader has spent in office from the beginning of their term to the 
beginning of the year in question. If this variable is negative and significant, it suggests that 
countries are switching leaders shortly before MIDs occur, revealing a potentially confounding 
selection process. Five Year Challenge Lag measures whether or not a country has been 
challenged in a MID in the last five years, a good indication of the interest a country might have 
in selecting a leader based on the ex-ante risk of a dispute. This controls for the possibility that a 
country in a more dangerous neighborhood may be more likely to select a leader with ex-ante 
characteristics that would bias the results. Finally, the results below are also consistent when I 
include some additional variables such as major power status, number of borders, trade openness, 
and a control for the Cold War, among others (Horowitz and Stam, 2012).  
All models presented below use Huber-White robust standard errors. I also control for 
leaders who spend a long time in office (e.g. Kim Il Sung of North Korea, Fidel Castro of Cuba) 
by clustering standard errors on the leader. This helps ensure that no individual leader skews the 
results. To control for time dependence in the data, I include variables measuring the time since 
the country was last in a MID, as well as the square and cube of that number (Carter and 
Signorino, 2010).  
Table 1 below shows the results. The first model includes only the key independent 
variables, and the results indicate that both prior rebel leadership and prior participation to 
rebellious actions have a statistically significant and positive effect on the likelihood of MID 
initiation. This provides strong initial evidence in support of the underlying argument that 
variations in the backgrounds of leaders have significant effects. I now turn to analyze the fully-
specified model to see the substantive effects associated with the indicators of prior rebel 
	   98	  
leadership and participation to rebellious movements and whether these indicators can be 
sustained in combination with, and when controlling for, other modifying factors. 
The full model (model 2) demonstrates the importance of rebel experience. A likelihood 
ratio test between a version of model 2 that does not include any leader variables and model 2 
with the leader variables indicates that the improved specification from adding the leader 
background variables is also statistically significant and improved the fit of the model. This 
points out the value-added from endogenizing the rebel experiences of leaders into models of 
international conflict. 
The results indicate that, as Hypothesis 1a predicts, having a prior rebel leadership 
experience has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood for a state leader to 
initiate an MID. All else being equal, state leaders who once led a rebellion are 37% more likely 
to initiate an MID than those who did not experience rebel leadership (p<0.01). This finding 
suggests that those leaders who come to power with prior rebel leadership experience –an 
inherently dangerous behavioral background– are likely to be more bellicose than their civilian 
counterparts when they enter office. This is likely partly due to the greater inherent propensity 
for risk on the part of former rebels, but also due to higher levels of martial efficacy due to their 
past success as rebel leaders. 
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Furthermore, Model 2 reveals that prior participation to a rebellion significantly increases 
the likelihood for a state leader to initiate an MID by 19% (p<0.05). It might be going too far to 
claim that participating to rebellious movements are much less riskier than leading them. This 
result, however, reveals that prior rebel leadership has a greater influence on the likelihood for a 
leader to initiate an MID than prior participation to rebellious movements. This finding may be 
driven by the fact that prior participation as a category includes a wider range from being a 
simple supporter to being a rebel elite. Being able to differentiate the extent of the participation 
with a larger universe of data would allow us to dig into this causal mechanism more efficiently.  
Figure 2 shows that a shift from a leader not having any kind of rebel background to 
having a rebel participation background increases the probability of a militarized dispute by 54%. 
Also, a shift from a leader having only a rebel participation experience to a leader with a rebel 
leadership experience increases the probability of a militarized dispute by 23%. Finally, a shift 
from a leader not having any kind of rebel experience to a leader who once led a rebellion 
increases the probability of an MID by 94% (King et al., 2000). 
The historical record, for instance, indicates two former rebel leaders to whom these 
results apply. Fidel Castro and Mobutu Sese Seko, both took power in autocracies and had 
extensive rebel experience (Horowitz and Stam, 2012). Both also engaged in international 
militarized behavior while in office. As described in detail below, these findings are not simply 
due to a selection process whereby countries that experience domestic turmoil are more likely to 
get involved in militarized disputes. They also are not solely due to regime type. Charles de 
Gaulle of France and David Ben Gurion of Israel are two former rebels who engaged in 
militarized behavior but led democracies. 
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Figure 2. Probability of MID Initiation Across State Leaders With Different Rebel 
Experience Conditions 
 
 
In Model 2, the control variables mostly appear in predicted ways. However, the results 
do not provide any empirical evidence for the argument that leaders with prior rebel experience 
tend to be conflictual to atone for past military failures. The variable of prior rebel loss does not 
have any statistically significant effect on the likelihood of MID initiation. The reason driving 
this finding may be the fact that Skocpol’s argument deals only with big revolutions and 
international defeats, and that the leaders in my dataset does not consist only of “revolutionary” 
leaders. Prior rebel win, on the other hand, has a statistically significant and positive effect on 
the likelihood of MID initiation. All else being equal, leaders with success as a rebel leader in 
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civil wars prior to entering office are over 36% more likely than their counterparts to initiate 
MIDs (p<0.1). 
Countries with more material power are more likely to initiate militarized disputes, and 
countries that have been involved in MIDs in the recent past are likely to continue being 
involved in MIDs in the future. Regime type is not significantly related to MID initiation, while 
older leaders appear more likely to initiate militarized disputes, consistent with Horowitz et al. 
(2005). 
One potential challenge to my results is that countries may select their leaders, at least in 
part, based on the collective beliefs among the country’s selectorate about the international 
security environment and the military challenges the country is likely to face. Especially in 
democracies where leaders have to deal with more competitive political environment than in 
autocracies, this concern would be most prominent. Indeed, in some countries, having a prior 
military background is regarded as an advantage for presidential candidates based on the view 
that military experience will help a president take necessary actions in a dangerous international 
security environment. The findings above, thus, might be biased by the fact that countries select 
leaders with rebel or, at least, military background when they believe they will be involved to 
MIDs. However, this kind of selection of leaders on the basis of predicted adequacy does not 
necessarily confront my theoretical argument. The historical record indicates that in most 
countries non-risky candidates with prior military experience are selected, rather than the “riskier” 
types (Horowitz and Stam, 2012). In the worst case scenario, however, I need to consider the 
probability that selection effects give influence to most decisions to select those leaders with 
military experience into office, which can be problematic for my findings.  
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On the other hand, it actually solidifies, rather than undermines, the theoretical 
assumption that leader backgrounds really matter. If selectorate in a country firmly believe that 
prior military background makes leaders more qualified to be president during risky times, and 
the leader, therefore, is selected because of his or her background, one would tell that 
background is important as a variable for examination. Still, I address this selection concern with 
my initial attempt to control for the length of time a leader spends in office and the recent 
militarized and martial history of the country. Prior research finds no significant relationship 
between length of time a leader spends in office and the probability of MID initiation, which is a 
finding the results above replicate (Horowitz et al., 2005).  Admittedly, the possibility still 
remains that selecting a leader with military background in office dissuades a militarized 
challenge from happening in the first place. While it is hard to perfectly address this concern, the 
rebel leadership and the prior rebel participation variables are statistically significant despite 
incorporating national MID participation in prior years into the fully model. Nevertheless, 
although the results of the Model 2 provide initial evidence that the relationship between prior 
rebel experience and bellicose behavior is not solely a result of selection effects, I estimate an 
additional model to more explicitly test for the ways that the leader selection process may bias 
the results. This significantly reduces the concern that leaders are being selected because of the 
key variables of interest.  
The model 3, thus, deals with the questions of selection and endogeneity by isolating the 
leaders who left office randomly. Some leaders die in office of natural causes, and the leaders 
who replace them through a regular entry process, e.g. a vice president of the United States who 
replaces a president that dies of natural causes in office, are subject to different selection criteria 
than a head of state. It is the top of the ticket, in democratic regimes, for example, whose 
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experiences generally matter most for selection purposes. Thus, those leaders who entered office 
through a regular (as opposed to irregular or foreign-imposed) process after the prior leader died 
of natural causes can be isolated, and, thus, I can test the theory on that set of leaders (Goemans 
et al., 2009; Horowitz and Stam, 2012).  
The results provide partial support for hypothesis 1a. There is still a significant and 
positive relationship between those with prior rebel participation experience and MID initiation. 
Prior participation to a rebellion increases the likelihood for a state leader to initiate an MID by 
13% (p<0.1). The rebel leadership experience variable, though, is not statistically significant, but 
this is to be expected since this setup excludes most of the former rebel leaders. The model 
shows that, even when I explicitly isolate those leaders who left office randomly, prior rebel 
experience still has a significant impact on militarized behavior.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I develop an argument about the rebel experiences of leaders and test it on 
a dataset covering the rebel backgrounds of 1084 heads of state from 1946-2001. The theory and 
the data allow me to move beyond evaluating the effect of domestic institutions on leaders to see 
how leaders may have an independent role in shaping national policy, especially militarized 
policy. 
 Describing how leaders affect states’ foreign policies in systematic and predictable ways 
does not imply that structural and unit-level variables do not matter. These results point out that 
they matter a great deal. However, this chapter demonstrates an important linkage between the 
prior rebel experiences of leaders and their propensity to initiate militarized disputes once in 
office. Put another way, leader backgrounds do communicate important information about basic 
	   105	  
behavioral tendencies and ceteris paribus beliefs. Prior rebel participation and leadership 
experience condition the way leaders view the use of force, making it crucial to understand how 
that experience explains the initiation and escalation of military force in general. 
The next step should be to improve the robustness of the results by developing several 
specifications that allow us to see whether the results are biased and/or altered by institutional 
factors. Also, there are several potential extensions for this research agenda. I focus in this 
chapter on the link between background rebel experiences and risk-taking behavior, rather than 
actual leader competence, but that is one promising way forward for the future. I must underline 
the fact that the results I present in here are limited. However, they simply refer to leaders’ and 
states’ willingness to take greater or lesser risks. In part, this reflects the links between the types 
of experiences I addressed here, ones that shape behavior through personality and risk attitude 
versus others that shape competence and skill through training. In future research, it could be 
fruitful and interesting to examine the success and failure of the risks that some leaders are more 
likely to take. Also, data that may allow us to differentiate the context of prior rebel experience 
would be truly beneficial since the combat/no-combat distinction within the prior participation to 
rebellious movements would communicate with the theoretical discussion much better.  
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CHAPTER VI. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
 
Conclusion 
Civil conflicts are complex and ambiguous phenomena that disable scholarly efforts that 
choose to investigate them along a single dimension. This complicated nature of the concept, 
instead, blurs our understanding of even the most straightforward conflict. Consequently, the 
question of rebel behavior does not indulge to monocausal explanations or overly simple 
dichotomous formulations. As an alternative approach, it seems plausible to think about 
contemporary rebel leaders as involving in a series of interactions with a variety of political and 
economic actors and influencing all stages of civil war. Despite the fact that it is impossible to 
identify all key challenges that influence the development of rebel governance of rebel leaders 
with a single catch-all variable, a leader-level concentration in the study of conflict still promises 
an outstanding potential for development.  
There is little doubt that rebel governance systems are influenced by a variety of factors 
altering rebel behavior, including –but not limited to– contextual determinants of the conflict, 
state capacity, civilian demands, rebel capabilities, geography, conflict intensity, ethnic 
fractionalization, the imbrication of foreign or transnational actors, and internal cleavages. At 
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each stage of the conflict, however, rebel leaders are the ones who have to refine their 
governance strategy in response to these versatile dynamics, employing or avoiding approaches 
in an evolutionary fashion. Despite the constraints imposed by the historical context and political 
environment, rebel leaders still have a considerably broad sphere of influence within civil 
conflicts.  
Indeed, we observe an emerging –though still incipient– literature on rebel leadership. 
The scholars of conflict have recently demonstrated that rebel leadership is likely to be a driving 
factor in the study of conflict even when leaders take off their guerilla uniforms and become the 
head of state. Rebel leadership, in this sense, has the potential to transform not only individuals 
who experience it but also conflicts in which they operate and even states where they find the 
opportunity to reach the top in their post-conflict political careers.  
Considering the importance, and potentially causal role, of rebel leaders in the study of 
conflict processes, this dissertation examined rebel leader survival, how and to what extent they 
influence rebels’ targeting civilians, and whether prior rebel leadership have an impact on the 
initiation of militarized interstate disputes.  I collected new data on rebel leaders, identifying 
their name, age, education level, and tenure. In doing so, I intended to make a significant 
contribution to the empirical end of the emerging study of rebel leaders to which the shift in 
focus, I think, is very promising. In addition to the new data, what I intended the study to provide 
are important information on leader-level characteristics of rebel governance, rebel leaders’ 
potential influences on rebel violence against civilians, and whether they take along their rebel 
experience when they pursue their political careers within a state structure.  
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I conclude the dissertation with a final discussion of each substantive chapter by placing 
the emphasis on their contribution to the literature; strengths, weaknesses and implications of the 
empirical findings; and, finally, thoughts on the future research directions.  
 
Implications for the study of rebel leader survival  
The motivating question of the first substantive chapter is what factors have an influence 
on rebel leader tenure. The short answer is that relative rebel strength, third-party involvement 
favoring the government, and oil production in the conflict-hosting country play a role in rebel 
leaders’ success in staying in power. Rebel groups, I find, which are at parity with or stronger 
than the government are far more likely to be led by a longer-tenured leader. The hazard is 82% 
lower for those leaders.  
This finding is interesting because it may support the view that the evidence in the 
literature that stronger rebel groups tend to fight shorter conflicts spurs further research. Indeed, 
this apparent asymmetry requires more attention since rebel groups that control territory or have 
transborder ethnic ties that are likely to support them –as other potential indicators of rebel 
strength– would tend to fight longer conflicts. Besides, one would assume that forces at parity 
would fight longer conflicts, given the mutual capacity to wage protracted conflict and the higher 
uncertainty about near-equal capabilities (Dixon, 2014). The duration of conflict, of course, does 
not necessarily goes hand in hand with rebel leader tenure. However, we would expect a higher 
likelihood of success for a rebellion when it is led by its initial organizer/commander throughout 
the conflict. Still though, this remains as an empirical question that has yet to be tested. 
Just as similarities, there are, as a matter of course, dissimilarities between rebel leaders’ 
tenure and state leaders’ tenure. For the purposes of this chapter, though, I focus on the 
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similarities. The discussion could be more extensive to further clarify what it means for a rebel 
leader’s tenure to end. One concern could be that when state leaders are successful they should 
be more likely to retain power but this may not be true for rebel leaders. Once rebel leaders are 
successful, they are more likely to obtain concessions or become state leaders. If this was the 
case, this could create problems for the theoretical argument and empirical tests. Variables such 
as relative rebel strength, for instance, might actually make it more likely for rebel leaders’ 
tenure to end because they are successful leaders and the rebel movement was no longer 
necessary. An extensive discussion speaking to this concern, however, would be a more 
prominent need if I did not use right-censored data in which a leader is not failed when the 
period under observation is completed.  This is exactly what I intend to focus on: rebel leaders 
who have not lost office before the war is over. 
The empirical investigation in this chapter also reveals that third-party support for the 
government increases the risk for rebel leaders to be removed. It is 2.4 times more likely to lose 
his position for a rebel leader when he fights against an externally supported government. The 
ability of foreign actors to effect and even replace governmental institutions in government-
controlled territories has clearly been well established (Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham, 2001; 
Nordstrom, 2004; Mampilly, 2011). In line with this insight, my finding suggests that fighting 
against an externally supported government significantly undermines rebel leaders’ ability to 
build and maintain stabilized rebel governance.  
The findings also indicate that a 1,000 tons increase in the oil production per capita 
significantly increases the hazard of rebel leader removal (by 28%). Furthermore, the risk for 
rebel leaders evidently increases, as the production level exceeds 3,000 tons/year. Scholars have 
found an association between the incidence of primary commodity exports and specifically oil 
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wealth in states and the onset and duration of civil wars. Several conflicts in resource rich states 
are defined by violent scramble to control oil resources (Reno, 2003). This is a pattern we 
observe especially in African civil wars, such as those in Angola, Sudan, DRC, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. In some of these conflicts, both incumbents and rebel leaders have hired private 
security companies from different countries such as the Ukraine and South Africa, to offer 
security assistance in exchange for privileged resource access (Mair, 2003). This signals that the 
conditions of conflict and violence in resource rich countries may involve a profiting by both 
incumbents and rebels (Nafziger and Auvinen, 2002). In other words, violence, as in the Liberia 
case, is likely to become a form of business rather than an instrument for furthering any coherent 
ideological or even ethnic interest (Ellis, 1998).40 This contextual transformation in the conflict 
is also likely to feed “greed and opportunity” mechanism, and, consequently, increase the risk for 
rebel leaders because of the potential boost to the competitive violence.   
One plausible concern about the findings in this chapter would be selection issues. More 
specifically, prospects for rebel success may influence whether rebel leaders start a civil conflict, 
whether external actors get involved in a civil conflict, and rebel leader survival. For example, 
the weak support for the external rebel support argument may be because external rebel support 
is more likely to occur in cases where rebel success and rebel leader survival is less likely. 
Where these factors are not controlled for, admittedly, it is hard to be completely confident that 
results are not biased. The current extent of data availability on rebel leaders, however, 
substantially restricts my ability to develop better-specified models that would be able to address 
such concerns. Being able to explicitly control for these factors with a larger universe of data 
should be the next task for future research.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In Sierra Leone, both the incumbent forces and the rebels profited from and enriched themselves through the civil 
war. Even the official army members in Sierra Leone and Liberia were often involved to illegal, informal and 
violent economy through protection, complicity and direct activities (Keen 2003; Ikelegbe, 2005). 
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Implications for the study of rebel leaders and civilian victimization 
Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) note that estimates of the total killed during the Congolese 
(DRC) civil war reach over 2.5 million. Only about 6% –or fewer than 150,000– of these were 
ascribable to battlefield combat. The numbers are 1.5 million and 11%, respectively, for the 
Angolan civil war. The table that Lacina and Gleditsch present simply shows that these two cases 
are not unique. What account, then, for the remaining who were killed? The current analyses 
contend that the contemporary modes of warfare are particularly indiscriminate, inhumane, or 
unjustifiably devastating to civilians. 
Recent evidence has convincingly indicated that the civilian victimization during civil 
war substantially follows a strategic logic (Downes, 2008; Kalyvas, 2006). Some scholars 
contend that rebel leaders consider the killing and maiming of civilians as an introductory 
complement to conventional battlefield activities. Rebel fighters, on the other hand, tend to treat 
one-sided violence as a supplement to the soldering for which they were hired and/or trained for. 
Furthermore, the autoregressive nature of one-sided violence in civil conflict also reveals that 
such strategies are of a relatively short-term nature because periods with less pronounced 
victimization trigger similarly calm phases (Schneider et al., 2012).  
Relying on these insights, the second substantive chapter focuses on the question whether, 
and if so in what way, rebel leader tenure has a significant impact on rebel violence against 
civilians. The increase in the length of rebel leaders’ tenure, I find, is associated with fewer 
civilians killed by rebels. This finding is robust to controls for leaders’ likelihood of survival, 
battle deaths in the conflict, intensity, conflict duration, and type of the conflict. 
This finding speaks to the idea that the variation in leader-level –which is highly likely to 
be greater than group-level– rebel behavior is potentially a promising path to research. In order 
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to understand dynamics of rebellion in a consistent manner, we need to dig into the leader-level 
predictors. Indeed, the more we do so, the more we can know about the relationship between 
rebels and civilians and the better we can understand the potential for a rebel movement to 
transition from a militarized organization to one concerned more about the relatively humane 
governance issues (Wood, 2003).  
The analysis in this chapter also begs for a larger universe of data upon which to draw 
more comprehensive conclusions.  The empirical investigation, I must admit, is not exempt from 
some limitations. The model specifications should be further developed in order to control better 
for group dynamics. Being able to alleviate any concern that the significant association between 
higher number of civilian killings and rebel leaders’ early tenure would be altered by some 
group-level factors will be the next task of research. Expanding the new data on rebel leaders 
across time and space will enable including a couple of more gorup-level predictors to the model 
specifications and, hopefully, strengthen the robustness of the findings presented in this chapter.  
 
Implications for the study of prior rebel experience and interstate conflict  
Unlike the literature on rebel leaders operating in civil conflict, the interstate conflict has 
had a well established body of research with leader-level analyses. It is conventional wisdom that 
military experience colors political elites’ attitudes about their country’s foreign policy goals 
(Feaver and Gelpi, 2004). Scholars of civilian-military relations assert that there are substantive 
differences of opinion between civilian and military leaders. In this sense, we should expect 
civilian and military leaders to approach the use of force differently.  
Relying on some micro-level data, revealing that exposure to combat makes people more 
risk acceptant, we should also expect prior rebel experience to have such influence on rebel 
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leaders’ post-conflict political careers. Leading a rebellion is a highly risky task, as rebel leaders 
must run the risk of failure –which is statistically very likely– and extremely severe 
consequences. Drawing on these, the third and final substantive chapter studies rebel leaders’ 
post-conflict political career where they become state leaders by specifically focusing on the 
potential impact of prior rebel experience in the likelihood for those leaders to initiate militarized 
interstate disputes. 
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter suggests that both prior rebel leadership 
and prior rebel participation have a positive and significant effect on the likelihood for a state 
leader to initiate an MID.  A shift from a leader not having any kind of rebel experience to a 
leader who once led a rebellion, I find, increases the probability of an MID by 94%. This finding 
is robust to controls for material capabilities of the state, satisfaction with the current 
international system, leader age, regime type, leaders’ time in office, states’ recent history of 
conflict, and prior rebel success.  
The findings are in line with the traditional school of thought arguing that militaries are 
susceptible to the use of force and seeking military solutions to political problems. In other 
words, the long-standing concern that military experience would make the leader more bellicose 
is also prominent for those states being led by ex-rebel leaders. In terms of policy implications, 
though, ex-rebel leaders differ from those with a regular military experience. In most cases, rebel 
leaders get into office by seizing the power –relying on their rebel success and/or charisma– 
whereas those with regular military experience –whom we observe mostly in the Western 
democracies– are selected into office. Therefore, there is opportunity for the selectorate not to 
choose the latter, while the selectorate, if any, in a post-civil conflict country might not be 
provided the chance of avoiding the presidency of the former. Indeed, this would fuel the conflict 
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circle in the long-term as instability and militaristic authoritarianism are likely to generate new 
groups with grievance.   
As a clear path for the next research agenda, I should focus on collecting more data to be 
able to differentiate the potential impacts of being exposed to combat during the rebellion. In 
addition to this, having data on combat/no-combat distinction within the prior participation to 
rebellious movements would also help to further specify the theoretical discussion. 
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